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Abstract
Trustworthy computing systems must provide data confidentiality and data integrity, and must be
available. This paper shows that these security properties can be provided by construction, by compiling
high-level, security-typed source code into explicitly distributed, security-typed target code. This code
transformation provably preserves the confidentiality, integrity, and availability properties of the source.
A key technical contribution is the new target language, which describes distributed computation. In this
language, any well-typed program satisfies noninterference properties that ensure confidentiality and
integrity. Further, the language supports the distribution and replication of code and data using quorum
replication, which enables simultaneous enforcement of integrity and availability. A novel timestamp
scheme handles out-of-order accesses by concurrent distributed threads without creating covert channels.
1 Introduction
Distributed computing systems are ubiquitous, yet we lack techniques for building them to be trustworthy.
A system is trustworthy when we have assurance that it will protect the confidentiality and integrity of data
it manipulates, and that the system will remain available. We use the term “trustworthy” to emphasize that
the notion of security used here includes all three core security properties: confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. Many different mechanisms are used to build trustworthy systems: for example, access con-
trols, replica coordination protocols, and cryptography. However, standard practice for designing distributed
systems does not give any direct assurance that security properties are enforced.
Our goal is systems that are trustworthy by construction; we aim for a construction process that uses
formal, high-level security requirements (including availability requirements) as inputs to guide the auto-
matic synthesis of trustworthy distributed systems. These systems should be trustworthy in the presence of
an attacker who has some power to observe, to modify, and to stop computation taking place on some host
machines in the system. Attacks on the system are assumed to take place at host machines. Network-level
attacks are not considered, although some network attacks can be viewed as attacks on the affected hosts;
other mechanisms (e.g., encryption) can help too.
In this approach, programmers use a high-level language to write programs that are not explicitly dis-
tributed, but that instead contain annotations (labels) specifying security requirements. It is the job of the
compiler to translate these high-level programs into trustworthy distributed systems satisfying the secu-
rity requirements. Earlier work on the Jif/split system [27, 28] explored security by construction, using
confidentiality and integrity policies to guide automatic partitioning and replication of code and data onto
a distributed system. But Jif/split could not express or enforce availability properties, did not formalize
translation, and consequently had only limited formal validation.
This paper shows how to enforce not only confidentiality and integrity, but also simple availability prop-
erties, within a common framework of program analysis and rewriting. This is the first unified enforcement
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scheme for all three major security properties in a distributed setting. Jif/split does not enforce availability—
in fact, its simple replication mechanisms can only reduce availability.
The paper makes the following specific contributions:
• A security-typed language, DSR (for Distributed Secure Reactors), is introduced to represent dis-
tributed, concurrent computation on replicated hosts. The type system of this language enforces data
confidentiality and integrity (specifically, it enforces noninterference [9]) even when low-integrity
components of the system are controlled by the attacker.
• A translation is given from a simple, high-level, sequential source language to DSR. The translation
formalizes the kind of translation done by Jif/split, while adding new mechanisms for enforcing avail-
ability. Perhaps most importantly, the translation is shown to result in a trustworthy system, because
the translation preserves typing for confidentiality and integrity, and preserves availability properties
as well.
• To make this translation possible, quorum replication [8, 11] is extended to be guided by explicit
security policies. Voting replicas can enforce both integrity and availability policies.
• A novel timestamp scheme is used to coordinate concurrent computations running on different repli-
cas, without introducing covert channels.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how the decentralized label
model [16] is extended to specify availability and explains how to interpret these trustworthiness specifica-
tions as properties of the distributed system. Section 3 describes the semantics of Aimp. Section 4 presents
a distributed system model and various mechanisms needed to obtain trustworthy computation. Section 5
introduces a security-typed language (DSR) for developing distributed programs. Section 6 proves the non-
interference result of DSR. Section 7 presents a translation from a sequential program to a distributed DSR
program, and prove the adequacy of the translation. Section 8 covers related work, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Overview
2.1 Labels and security assurance
Security requirements are explicitly defined using labels that annotate data items, memory locations, com-
putations, and host machines with policies. The label on a host specifies the strongest policies that the host is
trusted to enforce. Static dependency analysis is used to determine whether an annotated program enforces
its security policy annotations.
To take into account all the three core security properties, a security label ` = {C = l1, I = l2, A=
l3} contains three base labels l1, l2 and l3, specifying confidentiality, integrity and availability policies,
respectively. Furthermore, all the base labels form a lattice L, where the ordering l ≤ l′ means that l′
imposes requirements as least as strong as l, and the usual join (unionsq) and meet (u) operations exist. The
precise structure of L is unimportant to the results in this paper. As usual in type systems for information
flow, ` v `′ denotes that data labeled with ` is allowed to affect data labeled with `′, defined as C(`) ≤
C(`′) ∧ I(`′) ≤ I(`): low-confidentiality information can flow to higher-confidentiality levels, and high-
integrity information can flow to lower. Availability does not appear in the definition of v because low-
availability data can affect high-availability data without reducing its availability.
Labels express security requirements and, if enforced, constrain system behavior. Information remains
confidential if attackers cannot learn it by observing the system. Information has integrity if it is computed
as intended in the program. And information is available if it is received eventually, assuming that network
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messages from uncompromised hosts arrive eventually. These informal statements can be understood as non-
interference properties [9]. Intuitively, high-confidentiality inputs cannot interfere with low-confidentiality
outputs, and attackers cannot affect high-integrity outputs or make high-availability outputs unavailable [29].
The notions of low and high security are relative to the attacker’s power, which is specified by a base
label lA. Any base label l is a low-security label if l ≤ lA, and a high-security label otherwise. It is im-
portant not to assume that there are only two security levels (e.g., “high” and “low”), because distributed
systems need to be trustworthy from the viewpoint of all their users, who may not trust each other fully.
We assume the attacker can directly observe all information at confidentiality levels l ≤ lA, can arbitrarily
modify information at integrity levels l ≤ lA, and can make resources at availability levels l ≤ lA un-
available. Further, attackers can compromise hosts whose host label components are lower-security than lA
(more precisely, they can compromise the corresponding aspects of security on those hosts). The system is
trustworthy if no attacker, regardless of its power lA, can violate policies expressed by labels that are high-
security relative to lA. For example, the attacker should not be able to leverage its ability to directly modify
low-security locations to indirectly cause changes to high-integrity locations or to make high-availability
locations unavailable.
2.2 The Aimp language
The source language for the distributed system construction process is the simple sequential language Aimp
(for Availability + IMP) [29]. Aimp supports specifying high-level policies for confidentiality, integrity, and
availability, and its type system ensures that a well-typed program enforces these policies. The syntax of
Aimp is as follows:
Values v ::= n | none
Expressions e ::= v | !m | e1 + e2
Statements S ::= skip | m := e | S1;S2
| if e then S1 else S2 | while e do S
Types τ ::= int` | int` ref | stmtR
A memory location m is essentially a mutable variable. It can take the special value none to represent an
unavailable value. In Aimp, inputs and outputs are modeled by memory locations, so a location representing
an output is considered unavailable if its value is none.
Type int` is an integer annotated with security label `. A memory location m has type int` ref,
indicating the value stored at m has type int`. A statement S in Aimp has type stmtR where R contains
the set of output locations left unassigned and hence unavailable if S terminates.
The operational semantics and type system of Aimp are straightforward [29] and are not repeated here.
However, it is worth noting that to control implicit flows [5], the typing environment of an Aimp statement
includes a program counter label pc, which is the security label on information about the current program
point. It captures both the integrity and the sensitivity of control flow information.
2.3 Example
Figure 1 shows a simple bidding program involving a seller S, a buyer B, and a mediator T. The buyer has
three chances to bid for an item. If a bid price is above the reserve price of the seller, the buyer is required
to confirm the transaction. If the buyer confirms, its credit card is charged the bid price; otherwise, the
reputation of the buyer is negatively affected for not honoring a bid. For the purpose of presentation, this
example uses an array bid, where bid[t] can be viewed as syntactic sugar for three locations bid1, bid2
and bid3 that are accessed based on the value of t. At the end of the transaction, an exit code is assigned to
exit, which initially has the value none.
Security types of memory locations are provided by a typing assignment Γ, which maps locations to
types such that location m has type Γ(m) ref. For this example, security labels are specified using the
3
1 t := 0;
2 while (!t < 3) do
3 price := bid[t];
4 if (!price > !reserve) then t := 5
5 else t := !t + 1;
6 if (!t = 5) then
7 if (!cfm = 1) then cc := !cc + !price
8 else rep := !rep - 1;
9 exit := 1
10 else exit := 0
Typing assignment Γ:
price, reserve, t, cfm, exit : int`0 cc : int`1 rep : int`2
`0 = {C= ∗ :S∨B, I= ∗ : (S∧B)∨(S∧T)∨(B∧T), A= l}
`1 = {C = ∗ :B, I = ∗ :B∨(S∧T), A = l}
`2 = {C = ∗ :S, I = ∗ :S∨(B∧T), A = l}
Figure 1: Bidding example
extended decentralized label model (DLM) [29]. In the DLM, a base label is a set of owned policies, which
have the form u :p, where u is the policy owner, and p is a principal that u trusts with enforcing the security
property that the owned policy is applied to. It is possible to construct more complex principals using
conjunction and disjunction operators ∧ and ∨. The composite principal p1∧p2 represents a principal as
trustworthy as both p1 and p2; principal p1∨p2 represents a group of p1 and p2.
For example, consider the label `0 of price. In `0, principal ∗ represents the conjunction S∧B∧T, and T
represents a third party helping to mediate the transaction. The confidentiality label means that both S and
B can learn the contents of these locations. The integrity label indicates that affecting the values in these
locations requires the cooperation of at least two parties. For example, S∧B can cooperatively affect price,
since they are the two directly involved parties. If S and B disagree on the value of price, the mediator T
can keep the transaction going by agreeing with the value claimed by either S or B. As a result, both B∧T and
S∧T can affect the value of price. The availability component A(`0) is left unspecified but given the name
l. Suppose exit is the only output location. Because all the variables share the same availability policy l,
the availability policy of exit cannot be violated by making other variables unavailable.
Programs create interactions between availability and integrity. In this example, the value of t affects the
termination of the while statement, and thus the availability of exit. Therefore, the program is insecure
unless the constraint A(`0) ≤ I(`0) holds, intuitively meaning that any principal trusted with the integrity
of t is also trusted with the availability of exit. More generally, the constraint A(`) ≤ I(`) means that in
any situation where the availability of l is compromised, the integrity of l can be too.
2.4 Trustworthiness by construction
The type system of Aimp can guarantee that a well-typed program is trustworthy, assuming the program is
executed on a single trusted host. But we are interested in performing the computation of an Aimp program
S in a distributed system with untrusted hosts, while enforcing the security policies of S.
In a distributed setting, a location can be replicated onto a set of hosts to improve its integrity and
availability. Suppose the integrity labels of hosts h1, h2 and h3 are ∗ : S, ∗ : B and ∗ : T, respectively.
Then replicating price on hosts h1 and h2 is sufficient to enforce its integrity: a program reading the value
of price can request it from h1 and h2, and accept the value only if the responses from the two hosts
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are equal. To convince the reader to accept a corrupted value, attackers need to compromise both h1 and
h2, but that means attackers have the power of principal S∧B and are allowed to update price by I(`0).
However, if attackers compromise the integrity of either h1 or h2, they can make price unavailable by
sending the reader an inconsistent value. Higher availability can be achieved by replicating price on all the
three hosts. A reader would accept its value if any two hosts agree. Interestingly, the reader can continue
its computation if it receives three inconsistent responses. In that case, at least two hosts are compromised.
For this to be true, the attackers must have the power of principal S∧B, of B∧T, or of S∧T. Thus, the label
I(`0) permits attackers to directly update price, and therefore the inconsistent values do not violate the
security guarantee. Therefore, the reader can choose an arbitrary value as the value of price and continue
its computation.
Our approach is to translate a well-typed Aimp program into a distributed target program that faithfully
and securely performs the computation of the source program. To define this translation formally, we first
present a target language DSR whose type system enforces noninterference for confidentiality and integrity
in distributed settings. Then we present an adequate translation from Aimp to DSR, which preserves the
typing and semantics of the source program. Suppose a well-typed source program S is translated into a
target program P . By the preservation of typing, P is also well-typed, which means that P also satisfies
confidentiality and integrity noninterference. The adequacy of the translation means P makes as much
progress as the source program, and thus provides at least the same availability guarantees as S.
3 Semantics of Aimp
This section describes the operational semantics and type system of the source language Aimp.
3.1 Operational semantics
The small-step operational semantics of Aimp is given in Figure 2. Let M represent a memory that is a
finite map from locations to values (including none), and let 〈S, M〉 be a machine configuration. Then a
small evaluation step is a transition from 〈S, M〉 to another configuration 〈S′, M ′〉, written 〈S, M〉 7−→
〈S′, M ′〉.
The evaluation rules (S1)–(S7) are standard for an imperative language. Rules (E1)–(E3) are used to
evaluate expressions. Because an expression has no side-effect, we use the notation 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v to mean
that evaluating e in memoryM results in the value v. Rule (E1) is used to evaluate dereference expression
!m. In rule (E2), v1 + v2 is computed using the following formula:
v1 + v2 =
{
n1 + n2 if v1 = n1 and v2 = n2
none if v1 = none or v2 = none
Rules (S1), (S4)–(S7) show that if the evaluation of configuration 〈S, M〉 depends on the result of an
expression e, it must be the case that 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n. In other words, if 〈e, M〉 ⇓ none, the evaluation of
〈S, M〉 gets stuck.
3.2 Examples
By its simplicity, the Aimp language helps focus on the essentials of an imperative language. Figure 3 shows
a few code segments that demonstrate various kind of availability dependencies, some of which are subtle.
In all these examples, mo represents an output, and its initial value is none. All other references represent
inputs.
In code segment (A), if m1 is unavailable, the execution gets stuck at the first assignment. Therefore,
the availability ofmo depends on the availability ofm1.
In code segment (B), the while statement gets stuck if m1 is unavailable. Moreover, it diverges if the
value ofm1 is positive. Thus, the availability ofmo depends on both the availability and the value ofm1.
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[E1 ]
m ∈ dom(M)
〈!m, M〉 ⇓M(m)
[E2 ]
〈e1, M〉 ⇓ v1 〈e2, M〉 ⇓ v2 v = v1 + v2
〈e1 + e2, M〉 ⇓ v
[E3 ] 〈v, M〉 ⇓ v
[S1 ]
〈e, M〉 ⇓ n
〈m := e, M〉 7−→ 〈skip, M [m 7→ n]〉
[S2 ]
〈S1, M〉 7−→ 〈S′1, M ′〉
〈S1;S2, M〉 7−→ 〈S′1;S2, M ′〉
[S3 ] 〈skip; s, M〉 7−→ 〈S, M〉
[S4 ]
〈e, M〉 ⇓ n n > 0
〈if e then S1 else S2, M〉 7−→ 〈S1, M〉
[S5 ]
〈e, M〉 ⇓ n n ≤ 0
〈if e then S1 else S2, M〉 7−→ 〈S2, M〉
[S6 ]
〈e, M〉 ⇓ n n > 0
〈while e do S, M〉 7−→ 〈s; while e do S, M〉
[S7 ]
〈e, M〉 ⇓ n n ≤ 0
〈while e do S, M〉 7−→ 〈skip, M〉
Figure 2: Operational semantics for Aimp
(A) m2:=!m1; mo:= 1;
(B) while (!m1) do skip; mo:=1;
(C) if (!m1) then while (1) do skip; else skip;
mo:=1;
(D) if (!m1) then mo:=1 else skip;
while (!m2) do skip;
mo:=2;
Figure 3: Examples
In code segment (C), the if statement does not terminate if m1 is positive, so the availability of mo
depends on the value ofm1.
In code segment (D), mo is assigned in one branch of the if statement, but not in the other. Therefore,
when the if statement terminates, the availability ofmo depends on the value ofm1. Moreover, the program
executes a while statement that may diverge before mo is assigned value 2. Therefore, for the whole
program, the availability ofmo depends on the value ofm1.
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3.3 Noninterference properties
This section formalizes the noninterference properties (in particular, availability noninterference). Although
this formalization is done in the context of Aimp, it can be easily generalized to other state transition systems.
For both confidentiality and integrity, noninterference has a simple, intuitive description: equivalent
low-confidentiality (high-integrity) inputs always result in equivalent low-confidentiality (high-integrity)
outputs. The notion of availability noninterference is more subtle, because an attacker has two ways to
compromise the availability of an output. First, the attacker can make an input unavailable and block the
computation using the input. Second, the attacker can try to affect the integrity of control flow and make
the program diverge (fail to terminate). In other words, the availability of an output may depend on both the
integrity and availability of an input. The observation is captured by this intuitive description of availability
noninterference:
With all high-availability inputs available, equivalent high-integrity inputs will eventually result
in equally available high-availability outputs.
This formulation of noninterference provides a separation of concerns (and policies) for availability and
integrity, yet prevents the two attacks discussed above.
For an imperative language, the inputs of a program are just the initial memory, and the outputs are the
observable aspects of a program execution, which is defined by the observation model of the language. In
Aimp, we have the following observation model:
• Memories are observable.
• The value none is not observable. In other words, if M(m) = none, an observer cannot determine
the value ofm inM .
Suppose S is a program, and M is the initial memory. Based on the observation model, the outputs of S
are a set T of finite traces of memories, and for any trace T in T , there exists an evaluation 〈S, M〉 7−→
〈S1, M1〉 7−→ . . . 7−→ 〈Sn, Mn〉 such that T = [M,M1, . . . ,Mn]. Intuitively, every trace in T is the
outputs observable to users at some point during the evaluation of 〈S, M〉, and T represents all the outputs
of 〈S, M〉 observable to users. Since the Aimp language is deterministic, for any two traces in T , it must
be the case that one is a prefix of the other.
In the intuitive description of noninterference, equivalent low-confidentiality inputs can be represented
by two memories whose low-confidentiality parts are indistinguishable. Suppose the typing information of
a memory M is given by a typing assignment Γ. Then m belongs to the low-confidentiality part of M if
C(Γ(m)) ≤ lA, where C(Γ(m)) denotes C(`) if Γ(m) is int`. Similarly,m is a high-integrity reference if
I(Γ(m)) 6≤ lA, and a high-availability reference if A(Γ(m)) 6≤ lA. Let v1 ≈ v2 denote that v1 and v2 are
indistinguishable. By the observation model of Aimp, a user cannot distinguish none from any other value.
Consequently, v1 ≈ v2 if and only if v1 = v2, v1 = none or v2 = none. With these settings, given two
memoriesM1 andM2 with respect to Γ, we define three kinds of indistinguishability relations betweenM1
andM2 as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Γ ` M1 ≈C≤lA M2). The low-confidentiality parts of M1 and M2 are indistinguishable,
written Γ `M1 ≈C≤lA M2, if for anym ∈ dom(Γ), C(Γ(m)) ≤ lA impliesM1(m) ≈M2(m).
Definition 3.2 (Γ ` M1 ≈I 6≤lA M2). The high-integrity parts ofM1 andM2 are indistinguishable, written
Γ `M1 ≈I 6≤lA M2, if for anym ∈ dom(Γ), I(Γ(m)) 6≤ lA impliesM1(m) ≈M2(m).
Definition 3.3 (Γ ` M1 ≈A6≤lA M2). The high-availability parts of M1 and M2 are equally available,
written Γ ` M1 ≈A6≤lA M2, if for any m ∈ dom(Γ), A(Γ(m)) 6≤ lA implies that M1(m) = none if and
only ifM2(m) = none.
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Based on the definitions of memory indistinguishability, we can define trace indistinguishability, which
formalizes the notion of equivalent outputs. First, we assume that users cannot observe timing. As a result,
traces [M,M ] and [M ] look the same to a user. In general, two traces T1 and T2 are equivalent, written
T1 ≈ T2, if they are equal up to stuttering, which means the two traces obtained by eliminating repeated
elements in T1 and T2 are equal. For example, [M1,M2,M2] ≈ [M1,M1,M2]. Second, T1 and T2 are
indistinguishable, if T1 appears to be a prefix of T2, because in that case, T1 and T2 may be generated by the
same execution. Given two traces T1 and T2 of memories with respect to Γ, let Γ ` T1 ≈C≤lA T2 denote
that the low-confidentiality parts of T1 and T2 are indistinguishable, and Γ ` T1 ≈I 6≤lA T2 denote that the
high-integrity parts of T1 and T2 are indistinguishable. These two notions are defined as follows:
Definition 3.4 (Γ ` T1 ≈C≤lA T2). Given two traces T1 and T2, Γ ` T1 ≈C≤lA T2 if there exist T ′1 =
[M1, . . . ,Mn] and T ′2 = [M ′1, . . . ,M ′m] such that T1 ≈ T ′1, and T2 ≈ T ′2, and Γ ` Mi ≈C≤lA M ′i for any i
in {1, . . . , min(m,n)}.
Definition 3.5 (Γ ` T1 ≈I 6≤lA T2). Given two traces T1 and T2, Γ ` T1 ≈I 6≤lA T2 if there exist T ′1 =
[M1, . . . ,Mn] and T ′2 = [M ′1, . . . ,M ′m] such that T1 ≈ T ′1, and T2 ≈ T ′2, and Γ ` Mi ≈I 6≤lA M ′i for any i
in {1, . . . , min(m,n)}.
Note that two executions are indistinguishable if any two finite traces generated by those two execu-
tions are indistinguishable. Thus, we can still reason about the indistinguishability of two nonterminating
executions, even though ≈I 6≤lA and ≈C≤lA are defined on finite traces.
With the formal definitions of memory indistinguishability and trace indistinguishability, it is straight-
forward to formalize confidentiality noninterference and integrity noninterference:
Definition 3.6 (Confidentiality noninterference). A program S has the confidentiality noninterference prop-
erty w.r.t. a typing assignment Γ, written Γ ` NIC(S), if for any two traces T1 and T2 generated by
evaluating 〈S, M1〉 and 〈S, M2〉, we have that Γ `M1 ≈C≤lA M2 implies Γ ` T1 ≈C≤lA T2.
Note that this confidentiality noninterference property does not treat covert channels based on termina-
tion and timing. Static control of timing channels is largely orthogonal to this work, and has been partially
addressed elsewhere [21, 1, 19].
Definition 3.7 (Integrity noninterference). A program S has the integrity noninterference property w.r.t. a
typing assignment Γ, written Γ ` NII(S), if for any two traces T1 and T2 generated by evaluating 〈S, M1〉
and 〈S, M2〉, we have that Γ `M1 ≈I 6≤lA M2 implies Γ ` T1 ≈I 6≤lA T2.
Consider the intuitive description of availability noninterference. To formalize the notion that all the
high-availability inputs are available, we need to distinguish input references from unassigned output refer-
ences. Given a program S, letR denote the set of unassigned output references. In general, references inR
are mapped to none in the initial memory. Ifm 6∈ R, then referencem represents either an input, or an out-
put that is already been generated. Thus, given an initial memoryM , the notion that all the high-availability
inputs are available can be represented by ∀m. (A(Γ(m)) 6≤ lA ∧ m 6∈ R) ⇒ M(m) 6= none, as in the
following definition of availability noninterference:
Definition 3.8 (Availability noninterference). A program S has the availability noninterference property
w.r.t. a typing assignment Γ and a set of unassigned output referencesR, written Γ ;R ` NIA(S), if for any
two memoriesM1,M2, the following statements
• Γ `M1 ≈I 6≤lA M2
• For i ∈ {1, 2}, ∀m ∈ dom(Γ). A(Γ(m)) 6≤ lA ∧m 6∈ R ⇒Mi(m) 6= none
• 〈S, Mi〉 7−→∗ 〈S′i, M ′i〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}
imply that there exist 〈S′′i , M ′′i 〉 for i ∈ {1, 2} such that 〈S′i, M ′i〉 7−→∗ 〈S′′i , M ′′i 〉 and Γ `M ′′1 ≈A6≤lA M ′′2 .
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[INT ] Γ ;R ` n : int`
[NONE ] Γ ;R ` none : int`
[REF ]
Γ(m) = int`
Γ ;R ` m : int` ref
[DEREF ]
m 6∈ R Γ(m) = int`
Γ ;R `!m : int`
[ADD ]
Γ ;R ` e1 : int`1 Γ ;R ` e2 : int`2
Γ ;R ` e1 + e2 : int`1unionsq`2
[SKIP] Γ ;R ; pc ` skip : stmtR
[SEQ ]
Γ ;R ; pc ` S1 : stmtR1
Γ ;R1 ; pc ` S2 : stmtR2
Γ ;R ; pc ` S1;S2 : stmtR2
[ASSIGN ]
Γ ;R ` m : int` ref Γ ;R ` e : int`′
C(pc) unionsq C(`′) ≤ C(`) I(`) ≤ I(pc) u I(`′)
AΓ(R) ≤ A(`′)
Γ ;R ; pc ` m := e : stmtR−{m}
[IF ]
Γ ;R ` e : int` AΓ(R) ≤ A(`)
Γ ;R ; pc unionsq ` ` Si : τ i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ;R ; pc ` if e then S1 else S2 : τ
[WHILE ]
Γ ` e : int` Γ ;R ; pc unionsq ` ` S : stmtR
AΓ(R) ≤ I(`) u I(pc) uA(`)
Γ ;R ; pc ` while e do S : stmtR
[SUB ]
Γ ;R ; pc ` S : τ Γ ;R ; pc ` τ ≤ τ ′
Γ ;R ; pc ` S : τ ′
Figure 4: Typing rules for Aimp
3.4 Type system
The type system of Aimp is designed to ensure that any well-typed Aimp program satisfies the noninterfer-
ence properties defined in Section 3.3. For confidentiality and integrity, the type system performs a standard
static information flow analysis [5, 23]. For availability, the type system tracks the set of unassigned output
references and uses them to ensure that availability requirements are not violated.
To track unassigned output references, the typing environment for a statement S includes a component
R, which contains the set of unassigned output references before the execution of S. The typing judgment
for statements has the form: Γ ;R ; pc ` S : stmtR′ , where Γ is the typing assignment, and pc is the
program counter label [4] used to track security levels of the program counter. The typing judgment for
expressions has the form Γ ;R ` e : τ
The typing rules are shown in Figure 3.4. Rules (INT) and (NONE) check constants. An integer n has
type int` where ` can be an arbitrary label. The value none represents an unavailable value, so it can have
9
any data type. Since int is the only data type in Aimp, none has type int`.
Rule (REF) says that the type of a reference m is τ ref if Γ(m) = τ . In Aimp, a memory maps
references to values, and values always have integer types.
Rule (DEREF) checks dereference expressions. It disallows dereferencing the references inR, because
they are unassigned output references.
Rule (ADD) checks addition expressions. As discussed in Section 2, the label of e1+e2 is exactly `1unionsq`2
if ei has the label `i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Rule (SEQ) checks sequential statements. The premise Γ ;R ; pc ` S1 : stmtR1 means thatR1 is the set
of unassigned output references after S1 terminates and before S2 starts. Therefore, the typing environment
for S2 is Γ ;R1 ; pc. It is clear that S2 and S1;S2 terminate at the same point. Thus, S1;S2 has the same
type as S2.
Rule (ASSIGN) checks assignment statements. The statement m := e assigns the value of e to m,
creating an explicit information flow from e to m and an implicit flow from the program counter to m. To
control these information flows, this rule requires C(`′) unionsq C(pc) ≤ C(Γ(m)) to protect the confidentiality
of e and the program counter, and I(Γ(m)) ≤ I(pc) u C(`′) to protect the integrity ofm.
If the value of e is unavailable, the assignmentm := e will get stuck. Therefore, rule (ASSIGN) has the
premise AΓ(R) ≤ A(`′), where AΓ(R) =
⊔
m∈RA(Γ(m)), to ensure the availability of e is as high as the
availability of any unassigned output reference. For example, in the code segment (A) of Figure 3, the type
system ensures that A(Γ(mo)) ≤ A(Γ(m1)).
Finally, when the assignment m := e terminates, m should be removed from the set of unassigned
output references, and thus the statement has type stmtR−{m}.
Rule (IF) checks if statements. Consider the statement if ethenS1elseS2. The value of e determines
which branch is executed, so the program-counter labels for branches S1 and S2 subsume the label of e to
protect e from implicit flows. As usual, the if statement has type τ if both S1 and S2 have type τ . As in
rule (ASSIGN), the premise AΓ(R) ≤ A(`) ensures that e has sufficient availability.
Rule (WHILE) checks while statements. In this rule, the premise AΓ(R) ≤ I(`) u I(pc) u A(`)
can be decomposed into three constraints: AΓ(R) ≤ A(`), which ensures that e has sufficient availability,
AΓ(R) ≤ I(`), which prevents attackers from making the while statement diverge by compromising the
integrity of e, andAΓ(R) ≤ I(pc), which prevents attackers from affecting whether the control flow reaches
the while statement, because a while statement may diverge without any interaction with attackers.
For example, consider the code segments (B) and (C) in Figure 3, in which R = {mo}. Suppose
A(Γ(mo)) 6≤ lA. In (B), the constraint AΓ(R) ≤ I(`) of rule (WHILE) ensures I(Γ(m1)) 6≤ lA, so
attackers cannot affect the value of m1, and whether the while statement diverges. In (C), the constraint
AΓ(R) ≤ I(pc) guarantees I(pc) 6≤ lA, and thus I(Γ(m1)) 6≤ lA holds because I(pc) ≤ I(Γ(m1)).
Therefore, attackers cannot affect which branch of the if statement would be taken, or whether control
reaches the while statement.
Rule (SUB) is the standard subsumption rule. Let Γ ;R ; pc ` τ ≤ τ ′ denote that τ is a subtype of τ ′
with respect to the typing environment Γ ;R ; pc. The type system of Aimp has one subtyping rule:
[ST ]
R′ ⊆ R′′ ⊆ R
∀m, m ∈ R′′ −R′ ⇒ A(Γ(m)) ≤ I(pc)
Γ ;R ; pc ` stmtR′ ≤ stmtR′′
Suppose Γ ;R ; pc ` stmtR′ ≤ stmtR′′ and Γ ;R ; pc ` S : stmtR′ . Then Γ ;R ; pc ` S : stmtR′′
by rule (SUB). In other words, if R′ contains all the unassigned output references after S terminates, so
does R′′. This is guaranteed by the premise R′ ⊆ R′′ of rule (ST). The reference set R contains all
the unassigned output references before S is executed, so rule (ST) requires R′′ ⊆ R. Intuitively, that
the statement S can be treated as having type stmtR′′ is because there exists another control flow path
that bypasses S and does not assign to references in R′′ − R′. Consequently, for any m in R′′ − R′,
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the availability of m may depend on whether S is executed. Therefore, rule (ST) enforces the constraint
∀m, m ∈ R′′ −R′ ⇒ A(Γ(m)) ≤ I(pc).
Consider the assignmentmo := 1 in the code segment (D) of Figure 3. By rule (ASSIGN), Γ ;{mo} ; pc `
mo := 0 : stmt∅. For the else branch of the if statement, we have Γ ;{mo} ; pc ` skip : stmt{mo}. By
rule (IF), Γ ;{mo} ; pc ` mo := 0 : stmt{mo} needs to hold, which requires Γ ;{mo} ; pc ` stmt∅ ≤
stmt{mo}. In this example, the availability ofmo depends on which branch is taken, and we need to ensure
A(Γ(mo)) ≤ I(Γ(m1)). Indeed, if (D) is well typed, by rules (ST) and (IF), we have A(Γ(mo)) ≤ I(pc) ≤
I(Γ(m1)).
This type system satisfies the subject reduction property. Moreover, we can prove that any well-typed
program has confidentiality, integrity and availability noninterference properties. The proofs of the follow-
ing two theorems can be found in our previous technical report [30].
Theorem 3.1 (Subject reduction). Suppose Γ ;R ; pc ` S : τ , and dom(Γ) = dom(M). If 〈S, M〉 7−→
〈S′, M ′〉, then there exists R′ such that Γ ;R′ ; pc ` S′ : τ , and R′ ⊆ R, and for any m ∈ R − R′,
M ′(m) 6= none.
Theorem 3.2 (Noninterference). If Γ ;R ; pc ` S : τ , then Γ ` NIC(S), Γ ` NII(S) and Γ ;R ` NIA(S).
4 Secure distributed computation
The programming language DSR is a calculus for describing secure distributed programs. This section gives
an overview of the key mechanisms of DSR and how they can be used to build secure programs. A formal
description of DSR is found in Section 5.
4.1 Reactors
A distributed system is a set of networked host machines. Each host is a state machine that acts upon
incoming network messages, changing its local state and/or sending out messages to other hosts. The local
state of a host includes a memory mapping location names (references) to values. In the DSR language, the
reactions of a host to incoming messages are specified by reactors whose (simplified) syntax is:
c{pc, loc, z :τz, λy :τ .s}
where c is a unique name; pc is both the initial program counter label in the reactor (and an upper bound to
the labels of any side effects generated by the reactor); loc indicates where the reactor is located (which may
be a host, a set of hosts, or a more complicated replication scheme); s is the reactor body, a statement to be
executed when the reactor is invoked; both y :τ and z :τz are a list of variable declarations: y1 :τ1, . . . , yn :τn
and z1 :τz1, . . . , zk :τzk, where each yi or zi is a free variable of s. An empty list is denoted by  and may be
omitted from a reactor declaration. When reactor c is invoked on host h by a network message µ, a thread
is created on h to execute the statement s with variables y bound to the arguments embedded in µ, and
variables z bound to the values in an invocation context.
Each invocation of reactor c on host h is associated with an unique invocation context, which is called a
reactor closure and has the form 〈c, η, `,A, a〉, where η is an integer context identifier, ` is an access control
label, a runtime-enforced lower bound to the program counter label of the invoker, A is a record that maps
variables z to values, and a is a list of additional attributes discussed later. Because η is unique for a given
c, the pair 〈c, η〉 can be used to uniquely identify a closure, and is called a context identifier. For simplicity,
we use the term “closure 〈c, η〉” to denote the closure identified by 〈c, η〉. A message invoking reactor c has
the simplified form [exec 〈c, η〉 :: pc, v], where pc is the program counter label at the point of invocation,
and v is a list of arguments to which the variables y of reactor c are bound. All control transfers are done by
explicit exec statements; as in other process calculi (e.g., [15, 7]), reactors do not implicitly return to their
invokers.
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c1{pc, h1, λ.
setvar(〈c3.z, cid〉, !m1)
exec(c1, cid, pc) }
c2{pc, h2, λ.
exec(c3, cid, pc, !m2) }
c3{pc, h3, z :int`,
λy :int`.m := z + y }
(2) 〈c3, η, pc, {z : v1}, . . .〉
(1) [setvar 〈c3.z, η〉 :: v1]
(3) [exec 〈c2, η〉 :: pc] (4) [exec 〈c3, η〉 :: pc, v2]
h1
h2
h3
Figure 5: A distributed program
In general, a network message µ has the form [α :: β], where α is the message head identifying the
message and indicating its purpose, and β is the message body containing specific parameters. Both α and β
are lists of components. Two messages with the same message head if they are logically the same message,
sent by different replicas. We say that a message [α :: β] is sent to reactor c if α indicates that the purpose
of the message is to invoke c or change the state of some closure 〈c, η〉.
A distributed program in DSR is simply a set of reactor declarations. Figure 5 shows a DSR program
that simulates the Aimp statement m :=!m1+!m2. In this figure, messages and closures are labeled with
sequence numbers indicating their order of occurrence. Assume memory references m1, m2 and m are
located at hosts h1, h2 and h3, respectively. Accordingly, reactors c1 on host h1 reads the value of m1
and sends it to h3; reactor c2 on host h2 delivers the value of m2 to h3; reactor c3 on host h3 computes
the sum and updates m. In Figure 5, reactor c1 is invoked with a context identifier η. It executes the
statement setvar(〈c3.z3, cid〉, !m1, ), where cid is a variable bound to the current context identifier η.
The statement sends the message [setvar 〈c3.z3, η〉 :: v1] to h3 where v1 is the value ofm1. Upon receiving
the message, h3 updates the variable record of the closure 〈c3, η〉, mapping z to v. In parallel, c1 invokes c2
by running the statement exec(c2, cid, pc). Then reactor c2 executes the statement exec(c3, cid, pc, !m2)
to send the invocation message [exec 〈c3, η〉 :: pc, v2] to h3, where v2 is the value of m2. Once invoked,
reactor c3 executes the statementm := z+ y with y bound to the argument v2 of the invocation request, and
z bound to v1 according to the closure 〈c3, η〉.
An alternative way to implementm :=!m1+!m2 would be to make reactor c1 send the value v1 to c2 as
an argument in the invocation request, and then make c2 compute v1+!m2 and send the result to c3. This
way, there is no need for the variable binding mechanism based on closures. However, the value ofm1 needs
to be sent to h2, imposing an additional security requirement that h2 respects the confidentiality of m1. As
we can see, setvar operations and reactor closures make it possible to separate data flow and control flow,
providing more flexibility for constructing secure distributed computation.
4.2 Control transfer
Suppose a message µ = [exec 〈c, η〉 :: pcµ, v] is sent to invoke a reactor c{pc, ...} on host h. The condition
pcµ v pc is important because any side effect of c is caused by µ. This constraint prevents low-integrity
reactors, possibly controlled by attackers, from invoking high-integrity reactors and causing effects they
could not have on their own. It also prevents covert information channels via implicit flow [5]. However,
taken naively, this constraint leads to the infamous “label creep” problem: the integrity of control flow can
only be weakened and may eventually be unable to invoke any reactor.
In fact, a low-integrity message can be used to invoke a high-integrity closure 〈c, η〉, if the closure is
a linear entry, which means that it is the only closure that can be invoked by a low-integrity message, and
furthermore that there is no reactor running at a high-integrity level. Low-integrity reactors cannot harm
the integrity of computation by invoking a high-integrity linear entry, because that entry is the only way to
continue high-integrity computation.
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c0{`0, h0, λ. if !cfm=1
then chmod(c3, cid, `0, `1)
exec(c1, cid, `1)
else chmod(c3, `0, `2)
exec(c2, cid, `2) }
c1{`1, h1, λ. cc:=!cc+!price;
exec(c3, cid, `1) }
c2{`2, h2, λ. rep:=!rep-1;
exec(c3, cid, `2) }
c3{`0, h3, λ. exit:=1; }
(2) 〈c3, η, `1, . . .〉
(1) [chmod 〈c3, η〉 :: `0, `1]
(3) [exec 〈c1, η〉 :: `1]
(4) [exec 〈c3, η〉 :: `1]
h0
h1
h2
h3
Figure 6: Control transfer example
A simple protocol allows a low-integrity message to invoke a high-integrity linear entry: when a high-
integrity reactor c0 is ready to invoke a low-integrity reactor, it may choose to instruct a single high-
integrity closure 〈c, η〉 to accept low-integrity invocation requests. More concretely, c0 sends a message
[chmod 〈c, η〉 :: pc, `′] to host h′ where c is located. The chmod message means that 〈c, η〉 is a linear entry
that may by invoked by a message µ satisfying pcµ v `. Suppose the closure 〈c, η〉 on h has the form
〈c, η, `,A, a〉. Host h first checks the constraint pc v ` to ensure the chmodmessage has sufficient integrity.
If the constraint is satisfied, h sets `′ as the access control label of the closure 〈c, η〉. When the closure
〈c, η〉 is first created, its access control label is set as pc (the program counter label of c) to provide normal
protection.
Figure 6 illustrates a run of the control transfer protocol. The distributed program in Figure 6 performs
the same computation as lines 7–9 in Figure 1. Assume locations cfm, cc, rep and exit are located at hosts
h0, h1, h2 and h3, respectively. The if statement on line 7 needs to access cfm, and thus it is executed by
reactor c0 on host h0. Suppose c0 is invoked with a context identifier η, and the value of cfm is 1. Then
reactor c0 invokes reactor c1 that updates cc and invokes `0. Note that [exec 〈c3, η〉 :: `1] is a low-integrity
message with respect to c3. And 〈c3, η〉 is a linear entry when c0 invokes c1. To notify h3 that 〈c3, η〉 is a
linear entry, c0 runs the statement chmod(c3, cid, `0, `1) to send h3 a chmodmessage, which requests h3 to
change the access control label of 〈c3, η〉 to `1. The request is accepted because c0’s program counter label
`0 satisfies the access check. After executing the chmod statement, execution enters a low-integrity phase,
in which c0 is not allowed to produce any effect with an integrity label higher than I(`1). Then c0 invokes
c1, which is able to invoke 〈c3, η〉 because 〈c3, η〉 has a low-integrity access control label.
4.3 Replication and message synthesis
Replicating data is an effective way to achieve fault tolerance and ensure integrity and availability. In
general, computation has to be replicated too, because unreplicated computation is vulnerable to failure and
attack. In DSR, a reactor c can be replicated on a set of hosts H . The messages for c are sent to all the
hosts in H . The memory references accessed by c are also replicated on H , so that each replicas of c only
accesses its local memory and is executed independently of other replicas. The replicas of c are supposed to
produce the same messages, while replicas on bad hosts may send corrupted messages or simply not send
anything. The receiver host h of a message sent by c may receive the replicas of the message from different
hosts, including corrupted messages from bad hosts. Host h needs to identify the correct message from those
message replicas. This process is called message synthesis, using a message synthesizer pi that takes in a set
of messages sent by reactor replicas running on a set of hosts H , and returns one message with sufficient
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integrity.
The integrity of a message depends on the integrity of its senders. Suppose host h receives a message µ
with integrity label I(µ) from the host set H . Then the constraint I(µ) ≤ Iunionsq(H) =
⊔
h∈H I(h) guarantees
the integrity of µ. If I(µ) 6≤ lA, then an attacker needs to compromise all the hosts in H in order to
fabricate µ, which means that the attacker has the power to affect integrity level Iunionsq(H), that is, Iunionsq(H) ≤ lA,
contradicting I(µ) ≤ Iunionsq(H). Therefore, µ has sufficient integrity if I(µ) ≤ Iunionsq(H). By enforcing this
constraint, a message synthesizer is guaranteed to deliver messages with sufficient integrity. However, it is
not sufficient to guarantee availability, because the attacker can deliberately send inconsistent messages to
prevent a synthesizer from producing a message.
Intuitively, on receiving enough inconsistent messages, a synthesizer may be able to determine that the
attacker already controls enough hosts to fabricate a message with sufficient integrity. In this case, the
synthesizer can stop waiting and return a default message since the contents of the message are not trust-
worthy, and to continue to wait would turn an integrity failure into an availability failure. Abstractly, each
synthesizer pi is associated with a condition qualifiedpi, and if qualifiedpi(H) is true, then receiving
inconsistent messages from H implies that the integrity level of the attacker is higher than or equal to the
integrity of the expected message. Therefore, pi is able to produce a message if any qualified setH ′ is avail-
able, that is, all the hosts in H ′ are available. The availability label of H ′ can be computed by the formula
A(H ′) = Au(H ′) =
d
h∈H′ A(h), because A(H
′) is at most as strong as the availability label of any host
in H ′. Suppose a reactor replicated on H sends a message to be synthesized by pi. Then the availability
label of the message is computed using the following formula:
A(H,pi) =
⊔
H′⊆H ∧ qualifiedpi(H′)
Au(H ′)
For example, consider a label threshold synthesizer LT[I], which produces message µ if µ is sent by a
host set H such that I ≤ Iunionsq(H). Suppose H ′ is a qualified host set for LT[I]. Since a host is either good
(high-integrity) or bad (low-integrity), H ′ can be partitioned into two disjoint sets: good hosts H1 and bad
hosts H2. The messages sent by good hosts are always the same. If I ≤ Iunionsq(H1), then LT[I] would deliver
the message from H1. Otherwise, by the definition of a qualified set, I ≤ lA, which follows I ≤ Iunionsq(H2)
since Iunionsq(H2) ≤ lA. In other words, H ′ is qualified if I 6≤ Iunionsq(H1) implies I ≤ Iunionsq(H2). Based on this
observation, we have the following qualifiedLT[I] condition: H ′ is qualified if it cannot be partitioned into
two disjoint sets H1 and H2 such that I 6≤ Iunionsq(H1) and I 6≤ Iunionsq(H2). And the algorithm of LT[I] can be
described by the following pseudo-code, which synthesizes a set of messages µ1, . . . , µn from H:
LT[I](H, µ1, . . . , µn) {
if ∃H ′ ⊆ H. I ≤ Iunionsq(H ′) ∧ ∀hj ∈ H ′. µj = µ
then return µ
if qualifiedLT[I](H) then return µdefault
}
4.4 Using quorum systems
The label threshold synthesizer is based on the assumption that all the replicas on good hosts generate the
same outputs. The assumption requires that good hosts have the same local state. In particular, if a message
µ has its contents depending on the value of some memory referencem, then the replicas ofm on good hosts
must have the same value, or the replicas of µ cannot be synthesized using LT[I]. The consistency (equality)
between the replicas of m on good hosts essentially requires to synchronize the replicas of any reactor that
updates m. However, this strong synchronization requirement makes it difficult to guarantee availability.
Therefore, to achieve high availability, we need other replication schemes and message synthesis algorithms.
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Quorum systems are a well-know approach to implementing highly available shared memory [11, 14].
A quorum system Q is a collection of sets (quorums) of hosts, having the form 〈H, W1, . . . ,Wn〉, where
H is all the hosts in Q, and quorums W1, . . . ,Wn are subsets of H . Suppose a memory reference m is
replicated on a quorum system. Then an update tom is considered stable if it is completed on a quorum of
hosts. In DSR as in some other quorum systems [14], timestamps are used to distinguish different version
of the same replicated memory location. A read operation can get the most recent update by consulting
with a set of hosts intersecting each quorum. Using quorum protocols, only a subset of hosts is needed to
finish either a read or write operation. That is why replicating a memory location in a quorum system can
potentially achieve high availability for both reads and writes.
Quorum system protocols can be incorporated into the reactor model. First, the execution of reactors
keeps tracks of a timestamp that is incremented with every execution step. If m is assigned value v at
timestamp t, the versioned value v@t is recorded in the local memory as a version ofm. The asynchronous
execution model for reactors makes it possible that a reactor on host h updates m at time t while another
reactor on h still needs to accessm at an earlier time. To deal with this write-read conflict, the local memory
M on a host remembers the old versions of references, mapping a memory referencem to a set of versioned
values v@t. A derereference !m evaluated at time t results in the most recent version of m by the time t.
The type system of DSR prevents a versioned value from being used in any computation since a versioned
value may be outdated.
If reactor c on host h needs to use the value of a reference m replicated on a quorum system Q, some
reactor c′ replicated on Q is invoked to send to h the message [setvar 〈c.z, η〉 :: vi@ti] from each host hi
inQ, where vi@ti is the most recent version ofm on host hi by the timestamp t′ of c′. Host h uses a quorum
read synthesizer (written as QR[Q, I], where I is the integrity label of m) to find out the most recent value
of m before t′ and bind z to that value. It is possible that some high-integrity hosts replicating m missed
the update to it needed by c. However, all the hosts in at least one quorum in Q hold the needed version
of m. Therefore, if QR[Q, I] receives sufficient setvar messages from every quorum of Q, it can identify
the needed value with integrity I . Based on this insight, we have the following qualified condition for
QR[Q, I]: a host setH ′ is qualified with respect to QR[Q, I] if qualifiedLT[I](W∩H ′) holds for any quorum
W in Q. Intuitively, it means that the intersection between H ′ andW is a qualified set for LT[I], and thus
the messages fromH ′ ∩W are sufficient to determine the value held byW , ifW is the quorum holding the
most recent version of m. In fact, if the quorum W holds the most recent value v@t, then any good host
inW ∩H ′ must provide the value v@t. Furthermore, any good host in Q would not provide a value v′@t′
such that t < t′, since v@t is the most recent version.
Suppose µi = [setvar 〈c.z, η〉 :: vi@ti] (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are sent from H ′. Let H ′ ` v@t : I denote that
there exists a subset H ′′ of H ′ such that I ≤ Iunionsq(H ′) and for any host hj in H ′′, vj@tj = v@t. Intuitively,
the notation means that v@t is a version ofmwith sufficient integrity. Then the following QR[Q, I] algorithm
is able to return the appropriate version ofm with sufficient integrity:
QR[Q, I](H ′, µ1, . . . , µn) {
if qualifiedQR[Q,I](H
′) then
if H ′ ` v@t : I and ∀ti.t < ti ⇒ H ′ 6` vi@ti : I
then return {〈c.η, z〉, setvar :: v}
else return {〈c.η, z〉, setvar :: vdefault}
}
The quorum read synthesizer assumes that an update to m is stable by the time m is read by another
reactor. Supposem is replicated onQ and updated by reactor c. Then the reactor invoked by c is required to
wait for the invocation requests from a quorum of Q to ensure that the execution of c, including the update
to m, is completed on a quorum. This way, the update is guaranteed to be stable by the time m is accessed
by another reactor.
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An available quorum ensures that a write operation to terminate, while an available qualified set for
the quorum read synthesizer ensures a read operation to terminate. Therefore, the availability guarantees
provided by a quorum system for the read and write operations are as follows:
Awrite(Q) =
⊔
W∈QAu(W )
Aread,I(Q) =
⊔
H|qualifiedQR[Q,I](H)Au(H)
4.5 Multi-level timestamps
Timestamps introduce new, potentially covert, information channels. First, timestamps are incremented
at execution steps, and thus contain information about the execution path. Second, in quorum protocols,
timestamps can affect the result of a memory read.
We want to increment the timestamp so that (1) it stays consistent across different good replicas, and
(2) its value only depends on the part of the execution path with label ` such that ` v pc (where pc is
the current program counter label). To achieve this, DSR uses multi-level timestamps that track execution
history at different security levels. To simplify computation local to a reactor, a timestamp has two parts: the
global part tracks the invocations of reactors at different security levels; the local part tracks the execution
steps of a local reactor. Formally, a multi-level timestamp is a tuple 〈pc :n, δ〉: the global part pc :n is a
list of pairs 〈pc1 :n1, . . . , pck :nk〉, where pc1, . . . , pck are program counter labels satisfying the constraint
pc1 v . . . v pck, and n1, . . . , nk are integers. Intuitively, the component pci :ni means that the number of
reactors invoked at the level pci is ni. The local part δ is less significant than the global part in timestamp
comparison, and its concrete form will be discussed later.
When a multi-level timestamp t is incremented at a program point with label pc, the high-confidentiality
and low-integrity (with respect to pc) components of t are discarded, because those components are not
needed to track the time at the level pc, and discarding those components prevents insecure information
flows. Furthermore, the local part of a timestamp after the increment is reset to an initial state δ0. Suppose
t = 〈pc1 : n1, . . . , pck : nk; δ〉, and pci v pc and pci+1 6v pc. Then pci+1 : ni+1, . . . , pck : nk are
low-integrity components to be discarded, and incrementing t at level pc is carried out by the following
formula:
inc(t, pc) =
{ 〈pc1 :n1, . . . , pci :ni + 1; δ0〉 if pci = pc
〈pc1 :n1, . . . , pci :ni, pc :1; δ0〉 if pci 6= pc
When comparing two timestamps, low global components are more significant than high ones. Therefore,
for any pc, we always have t < inc(t, pc).
4.6 Example
Like Figure 6, the distributed program in Figure 7 performs the same computation as lines 7–9 in Figure 1,
but with the assumption that reference price is replicated on a quorum system Q. This example illustrates
how to read a memory reference replicated on a quorum system and how timestamps are tracked in a system.
A new reactor readprice is used to read the value of price and send the value to c1 so that c1 can compute
!cc+!price. The reactor readprice is replicated on the same quorum system as price so that each replica
of readprice can read the local replica of price and send it to host h1 using a setvar message. Host h1
uses QR[Q, I] (specified in the declaration of c1, and I = I(`1)) to synthesize the setvar messages sent
by replicas of readprice. If QR[Q, I] produces a message [setvar 〈c1.amt, η〉 :: v], then the value v is
recorded in the closure 〈c1, η〉 as the value of amt.
To track the time globally, every message carries the timestamp of its sender. Suppose the timestamp of
〈c0, η〉 is t0 = 〈`0 : 1; δ0〉. Then the timestamp t1 of the chmod message sent to h3 has the form 〈`0 : 1, δ1〉.
On receiving the chmod message, host h3 increments t1 and stores the timestamp t2 = inc(t1, `0) =
〈`0 : 2; δ0〉 in the closure 〈c3, η〉. When 〈c3, η〉 is invoked by a low-integrity message, t2 would be used
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c0{`0, h0, λ. if !cfm=1
then chmod(c3, cid, `0, `1)
exec(c1, cid, `1)
else chmod(c3, `0, `2)
exec(c2, cid, `2) }
c1{`1, h1, QR[Q, I] . amt :int`1 ,
λ. cc:=!cc + amt;
exec(c3, cid, `1) }
QR[Q, I] (5)〈c1, η, `1, {amt : v}, . . .〉
LT[I]
c3{`0, h3, λ. exit:=1; }
(2) 〈c3, η, `1, . . . , t2〉
readprice{`1,Q,
λ.setvar(〈c1.z, cid〉, !price);
exec(c1, cid, `1) }
readprice{`1,Q, . . . , }
readprice{`1,Q, . . . , }
h0
h1 h3
h′1
h′2
h′n
...
(1) [chmod 〈c3, η〉 :: `0, `1, t1]
(3) [exec 〈readprice, η〉 :: `1, t3]
(7) [exec 〈c3, η〉 :: `1, t7]
(4) [setvar 〈c1.amt, η〉 :: v′i@t′i, t4]
(6) [exec 〈c1, η〉 :: `1, t5]
Figure 7: A running example
as the initial timestamp of the thread of 〈c3, η〉 instead of the timestamp obtained by incrementing t7,
the timestamp of the invocation message, because t7 is not sufficiently trustworthy. In Figure 7, replicas
of readprice are invoked by an exec message carrying timestamp t3 = 〈`0 : 1; δ3〉. Since the program
counter label of readprice is `1, the initial timestamp for 〈readprice, η〉 is inc(t3, `1) = 〈`0 :1, `1 :1; δ0〉.
Similarly, the initial timestamp of 〈c1, η〉 is inc(t5, `1) = 〈`0 : 1, `1 : 2; δ0〉. More interestingly, when the
linear entry 〈c3, η〉 is invoked, the timestamp of the invocation request is ignored. And the initial timestamp
of 〈c3, η〉 is t2, which equals to inc(t7, `0) if t7 is correct.
5 The DSR language
This section formally describes the DSR language, making the security mechanisms already introduced
more precise. The key difference between DSR and prior distributed calculi [15, 7] is that DSR provides
explicit language constructs for replication and run-time security labels so that these mechanisms can be
statically analyzed by a type system.
5.1 Syntax
The syntax of the DSR language is shown in Figure 5.1. A value v may be a variable x, an integer n, a
closure identifier η, a memory reference m, the unavailable value none, a reactor c[v], a remote variable
〈c[v].z, v〉, a versioned value v@t, or a label `. Expressions and statements are standard except for the three
reactor operations exec, chmod and setvar:
• exec(c, η, pc, Q, e) invokes a reactor 〈c, η〉. Arguments pc andQ are the program counter label and
the quorum system of the caller; the values of e are arguments for the reactor.
• chmod(c, η, pc, Q, `) changes the access-control label of reactor instance 〈c, η〉 to `.
• setvar(v, e) initializes a remote variable v with the value of e. The value is stored in the closure of
v.
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Host h ∈ H
Base labels l ∈ L
Labels `, pc ::= {C= l1, I= l2, A= l3} | x
Timestamps t ::= 〈pc :n ; n〉
Values v ::= x | n | η | m | none | c[v] | 〈c[v].z, v〉 | v@t | `
Expressions e ::= v | !e | e1 + e2
Statements s ::= skip | v := e | s1; s2 | if e then s1 else s2
| exec(v1, v2, pc, Q, e) | chmod(v1, v2, pc, Q, `) | setvar(v, e)
Reactor decls r ::= c[x :σ]{pc, Q, pi . z :τ , λy :τ .s}
Synthesizers pi ::= QR[Q, I] | LT[I]
Base types β ::= int | label | τ ref | τ var
| reactor[x :σ]{pc, pi . z :τ1, τ2}
| reactor[x :σ]{pc, τ2}
Security types σ ::= β`
Types τ ::= σ | σ@Q | stmtpc
Host sets H,W ::= {h1, . . . , hn}
Quorum systems Q ::= 〈H,W 〉 | &v | #v
Programs P ::= {r1, . . . , rn}
Figure 8: Syntax of the DSR language
To facilitate writing generic code, reactors may be polymorphic. The full form of a reactor declaration
is:
c[x :σ]{pc, Q, pi . z :τ1, λy :τ2. s}
where x :σ is a list of parameter declarations. If values v have types σ, then c[v] can be used as the name
of a reactor. Variables y and z may be used in s. Variables z are initialized by messages passing through
synthesizers pi, which can be either QR[Q, I] or LT[I].
A base type β can be int (integer), label (security label), τ ref (reference of type τ ), τ var (remote
variable of type τ ) and reactor type reactor[x :σ]{pc, pi . z :τ1, τ2} whose components are interpreted the
same way as in a reactor declaration. A reactor type may also have a simplified form reactor[x :σ]{pc, τ2},
which contains sufficient typing information for checking the invocation, while providing polymorphism
over the arguments z.
A security type σ has the form β`, a base type annotated with security label `. Like security policies,
replication schemes are also specified as type annotations. A located type σ@Q indicates that data with this
type is replicated on the quorum system Q. Moreover, if v is a reference replicated on Q, &v represents Q,
and #v represents 〈H, ∅〉, where H = |Q| is the set of hosts in Q. The type of a statement s has the form
stmtpc, which means that after s terminates, the program counter label is pc.
5.2 Operational semantics
A system configuration is a tuple 〈Θ, M, E〉 where Θ is a thread pool, M is a global memory, and E is
a system environment that captures system state other than memory, including messages and closures. A
thread is represented by a tuple 〈s, t, h, c[v], η〉 where s, t and h are the code, timestamp, and location
of the thread, respectively; 〈c[v], η〉 is the reactor instance of this thread. The environment E is a tuple
〈MT, CT 〉 whereMT is a message table mapping a host pair 〈hs, hr〉 to the set of messages sent from hs
to hr, and CT is a closure table mapping a tuple 〈h, c[v], η〉 to the closure identified by 〈c[v], η〉 on h.
To read and update various program states in a system configuration, the evaluation rules of DSR use
the following notations:
• M[h,m, t]: the value ofm on host h at time t. IfM[h,m, t] = v, then v@t ∈M[h][m].
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[E1 ]
M(m) = v
〈!m, M〉 ⇓ v [E2 ]
〈ei, M〉 ⇓ ni i ∈ {1, 2} n = n1 + n2
〈e1 + e2, M〉 ⇓ n [E3 ] 〈v, M〉 ⇓ v
[S1 ]
〈e, M〉 ⇓ n
〈m := e, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈skip, M [m 7→ n@t], Ω, t+ 1〉 [S2 ]
〈s1, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈s′1, M ′, Ω′, t′〉
〈s1; s2, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈s′1; s2, M ′, Ω′, t′〉
[S3 ] 〈skip; s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈s, M, Ω, t+ 1〉 [S4 ] 〈fi; s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈s, M, Ω, t . 1〉
[S5 ]
〈e, M〉 ⇓ n n > 0
〈if e then s1 else s2, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈s1; fi, M, Ω, t / 1〉 [S6 ]
〈e, M〉 ⇓ n n ≤ 0
〈if e then s1 else s2, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈s2; fi, M, Ω, t / 1〉
[S7 ]
〈e, M〉 ⇓ v1 v1 6= none
〈exec(c[v], η, pc, Q, e), M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈halt, M, Ω ∪ [exec 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, v1,Q, t], t+ 1〉
[S8 ] 〈chmod(c[v], η, pc, Q, `), M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈skip, M, Ω ∪ [chmod 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, `,Q, t], t+ 1〉
[S9 ]
〈e, M〉 ⇓ v v 6= none
〈setvar(〈c[v].z, η〉, e), M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈skip, M, Ω ∪ [setvar 〈c[v].z, η〉 :: v, t], t+ 1〉
[G1 ]
〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′, Ω′, t′〉 M(h, t) =M E ′ = (if Ω′ = Ω ∪ {µ} then E [messages(h) 7→+ µ] else E)
〈〈s, t, h, c[v], η〉 ‖ Θ, M, E〉 7−→ 〈〈s′, t′, h, c[v], η〉 ‖ Θ, M[h 7→t M ′], E ′〉
[M1 ]
E .closure(h, c[v], η) = 〈c[v], η, `,A, t′, on〉 P (c[v]) = c[v]{pc′, Q′, pi . z :τ2, λy :τ1.s} ∀zi.A(zi) 6= none
E .messages(∗, h, [c[v], η, exec :: ∗]) = 〈H,h, µ〉 LT[`](H,µ) = [c[v], η, exec :: pc, v1,Q, t]
∃W ∈ Q. W ⊆ H pc v ` Γ ` v1 : τ1 t′′ = (if pc v pc′ then inc(t, pc′) else t′) t′ 6= none⇒ t ≤ t′
E ′ = E [closure(h, c[v], η) 7→ 〈c[v], η, `,A, t′′, off〉] A′ = A[y 7→ v1][cid 7→ η][nid 7→ hash(t′′)]
〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→ 〈Θ ‖ 〈s[A′], t′′, h, c[v], η〉, M, E ′〉
[M2 ]
E .closure(h, c[v], η) = 〈c[v], η, `,A, t′, on〉 E .messages(∗, h, [c[v], η, chmod :: x, y, ∗], x v ` v y) = 〈H,h, µ〉
LT[`](H,µ) = [c[v], η, chmod :: pc, `′,Q, t] ∃W ∈ Q. W ⊆ H ` 6= `′ t′′ = (if pc v pc′ then inc(t, `) else t′)
〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→ 〈Θ, M, E [closure(h, c[v], η) 7→ 〈c[v], η, `′,A, t′′, on〉]〉
[M3 ]
E .closure(h, c[v], η) = 〈c[v], η, `,A, t′, on〉 A(zi) = none P (c[v]) = c[v]{pc′, H ′, pi . z :τ , λy :τ1.s}
E .messages(∗, h, [〈c[v].zi, η〉, setvar :: ∗]) = 〈H,h, µ〉 pii(H,µ) = [〈c[v].η, zi〉, setvar :: v, t] Γ ` v : τi[v/x]
〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→ 〈Θ, M, E [closure(h, c[v], η) 7→ 〈c[v], η, `,A[zi 7→ v], t′, on〉]〉
[A1 ]
I(h) ≤ lA M(h, t) =M Γ(m) = σ or σ@Q
M ′ =M [m 7→ v@t] Γ ` v : σ
〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→ 〈Θ, M[h 7→t M ′], E〉 [A2 ]
I(h) ≤ lA Γ ` µ
〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→ 〈Θ, M, E [messages(h, h′) 7→+ µ]〉
[A3 ]
A(h) ≤ lA
〈〈s, t, h, c[v], η〉 ‖ Θ, M, E〉 7−→ 〈〈abort, t, h, c[v], η〉 ‖ Θ, M, E〉
Figure 9: Operational semantics of DSR with respect to Γ and P
• M(h, t): a snapshot ofM on host h at time t. SupposeM(h, t) = M . ThenM maps references to
versioned values, andM [m] is the most recent version ofm on host h by the time t.
• E [messages(h) 7→+ µ]: the environment obtained by adding the message µ sent by host h to E .
Suppose E [messages(h) 7→+ µ] = E ′. Then E ′.MT [h, h′] = E .MT [h, h′] ∪ {µ} for any h′ ∈
receivers(µ), and for any other host pair h1, h2, E ′.MT [h1, h2] = E .MT [h1, h2].
• E [messages(h1, h2) 7→+ µ]: the environment obtained by adding µ to E as a message sent from h1 to
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h2.
• M[h 7→t M ]: the memory obtained by incorporating into M the memory snapshot M on host h at
time t. Suppose M[h 7→t M ] = M′. Then M [m] = v@t implies that M′[h,m, t] = v, and for
any host h′, time t′ and reference m′, h′ 6= h or t′ 6= t or M [m′] 6= v@t implies M′[h′,m′, t′] =
M[h′,m′, t′].
• E [closure(h, c[v], η) 7→ k]: the environment obtained by mapping 〈h, c[v], η〉 to closure k in the
closure table of E .
The operational semantics of DSR is given in Figure 5.2. The evaluation of a term may need to use the
reactor declarations (the program text P ) and the typing assignment Γ of memory, which maps references
to types. For succinctness, Γ and P are implicitly used by the evaluation rules in Figure 5.2. In addition,
three auxiliary statements may appear during execution, although they cannot appear in programs. They are
halt, indicating the normal termination of a thread, abort, indicating an availability failure, and fi, ending
the execution of a conditional statement.
Rules (E1)–(E3) are used to evaluate expressions. These rules are standard. Because expressions have
no side effects, the notation 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v means that evaluating e inM results in the value v. The notation
M(m) represents the value of m inM . IfM [m] = v@t,thenM(m) is v@t if m is replicated on multiple
hosts, and v otherwise.
Rules (S1) through (S9) are used to execute statements on a single host, defining a local evaluation
relation 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′, Ω′, t′〉, where the output Ω keeps track of outgoing messages from this
host.
Rules (S1)–(S6) are largely standard. The interesting part is the manipulation of timestamps. Each
evaluation step increments the local part of the timestamp t. To avoid covert implicit flows, executing
a conditional statement should eventually cause the timestamp to be incremented exactly once no matter
which branch is taken. When entering a branch, in (S5) and (S6), a new component is appended to the local
part of t; when exiting a branch in (S4), the last component is discarded. Given t = 〈pc : n ; n′1, . . . , n′k〉,
the following auxiliary functions manipulate timestamps:
t+ 1 = 〈pc : n ; n′1, . . . , n′k + 1〉
t / 1 = 〈pc : n ; n′1, . . . , n′k, 1〉
t . 1 = 〈pc : n ; n′1, . . . , n′k−1 + 1〉
Rules (S7)–(S9) evaluate the three reactor primitives. They all send out a network message encod-
ing the corresponding command. In rule (S7), the exec statement produces the message [c[v], η, exec ::
pc, v1,Q, t], where Q is the quorum system of the sender that potentially contains an unstable memory up-
date. The destination hosts of this message are determined by c[v]. After the execution of an exec statement,
the current thread is terminated, evaluating to halt.
A global evaluation step is a transition 〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉. Rule (G1) defines global transi-
tions by lifting local evaluation steps, using changes to the local memory and outgoing messages to update
the system configuration.
Rule (M1) handles exec messages. This rule is applicable when host h receives exec messages that
can be synthesized into a valid invocation request for a reactor instance 〈c[v], η〉. The following auxiliary
function retrieves the set of messages with some property from environment E :
E .messages(h˜s, h˜r, µ˜, C) = 〈h, h′, µ〉
where h˜s are h˜r are host patterns that may be some host h, or a wild card ∗ representing any host, or
some variable x; µ˜ is a message pattern, a message with some components replaced by ∗ or x; C is a set of
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constraints on the variables appearing in these patterns. The result 〈h, h′, µ〉 is a list of 〈hi, h′i, µi〉 tuples
where hi and h′i are the sender and µi matches the pattern and satisfies C. To abuse notation a bit, h can
be represented by H = {h1, . . . , hn}, or hs if h = hs, . . . , hs. For example, in rule (M1), the function
E .messages(∗, h, [c[v], η, exec :: ∗]) returns all the messages in E that are sent to h and have the message
head 〈c[v], η, exec〉. The result of the function is 〈H,h, µ〉, whereH = {h1, . . . , hn}, and hi sends µi to h.
Therefore, H and µ can be fed to the message synthesizer LT[`] (abbreviation for LT[I(`)]), where ` is the
access control label of the closure of 〈c[v], η〉. This guarantees that the set of senders have sufficient integrity
to invoke the reactor instance. The closure of 〈c[v], η〉 on host h is retrieved from E by the auxiliary function
E .closure(h, c[v], η). A reactor closure has six attributes: `, the access control label, A, an argument map
that maps variables z to values, t, the initial timestamp of the thread generated by invoking the closure,
and state, a flag for the invocation state, which could be either on (yet to be invoked on this host) or off
(already invoked). Suppose P (c) gives the declaration of reactor c. Then P (c[v]) = P (c)[v/x], where x are
parameters of c. Once LT[`] returns an invocation request [c[v], η, exec :: pc, v1,Q, t], host h verifies a few
constraints to ensure the validity of the request:
• ∀zi.A(zi) 6= none. This constraint guarantees that variables z are all initialized.
• ∃W ∈ Q.W ⊆ H . This constraint ensures that all memory updates of the caller are stable.
• pc v `. This label constraint controls the implicit flows by ensuring the program point of the caller
has sufficient integrity and does not reveal confidential information.
• Γ ` v1 : τ1. Run-time type checking ensures that the arguments of the request are well-typed.
After the request is checked, host h creates a new thread whose code is s[A′], meaning the result of
applying substitution A′ to s. In particular, the current closure identifier cid is η, and the new closure
identifier nid is the hash of the current timestamp t′′, which is either t′, or inc(t, pc′) if pc v pc′. The state
of the closure is set to off to prevent more invocations.
Rule (M2) handles chmod messages. Suppose the chmod messages to be processed are for the reactor
instance 〈c[v], η〉. Like in (M1), the closure 〈c[v], η, `,A, t′, on〉 of the reactor instance is retrieved from
E ; LT[`] is used to synthesize the chmod messages. Then rule (M2) verifies three constraints. The quorum
constraint and the label constraint pc v ` are similar to those in (M1). The label constraint ` 6= `′ ensures
that the chmod request has not been processed. Once the request is accepted, the closure’s timestamp is
initialized if necessary, and its access control label is set to `′.
Rule (M3) handles setvar messages. Suppose the corresponding request is to initialize variable zi of
the reactor instance 〈c[v], η〉. Then pii is the message synthesizer to use, according to the declaration of c[v].
If pii returns a setvar request with a well-typed initial value v, and zi has not yet been initialized, then zi is
bound to v in the closure.
In a distributed system, attackers can launch active attacks using the hosts they control. Rules (A1)
through (A3) simulate the effects of those attacks. In general, integrity attacks fall into two categories:
modifying the memory of a bad host and sending messages from a bad host. Rules (A1) and (A2) correspond
to these two kinds of attacks. The constraint I(h) ≤ lA indicates that the attacker is able to compromise
the integrity of host h. In rule (A1), an arbitrary memory reference m on host h is modified. Note that
we assume the attack does not violate the well-typedness of the memory. This assumption does not limit
the power of an attacker because the effects of an ill-typed memory would either cause the execution of
a thread to get stuck—essentially an availability attack—or produce an ill-typed message, which a correct
receiver would ignore. In rule (A2), an arbitrary message µ is sent from host h. Again, we assume that µ
is well-typed without loss of generality. Rule (A3) simulates an availability attack by aborting a thread of a
host h whose availability may be compromised by the attacker.
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[INT ] ` n : int` [CID ] ` η : int` [LABEL ] ` {C= l1, I= l2, A= l3} : label` [VAR ] Γ ` x : Γ(x)
[REACTOR ]
P (c) = c[x :σ]{pc, Q, pi . z :τ1, λy :τ2. s}
Γ ` v : σ[v/x] ` v σ[v/x] ` v pc[v/x]
Cunionsq(τ1[v/x]) unionsq Cunionsq(τ2[v/x]) unionsq C(pc[v/x]) ≤ Cu(Q[v/x])
Γ ;P ` c[v] : reactor[v/x]{pc, pi . z :τ1, τ2}` [ARG ]
Γ ;P ` c[v] : reactor{pc, pi . z :τ, τ2}`
` v : int` FV (v) = ∅ ` v τi
Γ ;P ` 〈c[v].zi, v〉 : (pii ⊗ τi var)`
[LOC ]
Γ(m) = τ
Γ ` m : (τ ref)` [TV ]
Γ ` v : σ
Γ ;Q ` v@t : σ@Q [ADD ]
Γ ` ei : int`i i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ` e1 + e2 : int`1unionsq`2
[DEREF ]
Γ ` e : (τ ref)` readable(Q, τ)
Γ ;Q `!e : τ unionsq `
[ASSI ]
Γ ` v : (τ ref)` Γ ` e : σ
base(τ) = σ writable(Q, τ) pc unionsq ` v σ
Γ ;Q ; pc ` v := e : stmtpc [SEQ ]
Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s1 : stmtpc1
Γ ;P ;Q ; pc1 ` s2 : stmtpc2
Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s1; s2 : stmtpc2
[IF ]
Γ ;Q ` e : int`
Γ ;P ;Q ; pc unionsq ` ` si : τ i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` if e then s1 else s2 : τ
[EXEC ]
Γ ;P ` v1 : reactor{pc′, pi . z :τ, τ2}`
Γ ;Q ` v2 : int` Γ ` ` : label` Γ ;P ;Q ` e : τ2
pc v τ2 pc v `
Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` exec(v1, v2, `, Q, e) : stmtpc [CHMD ]
Γ ;P ` v1 : reactor{pc′, pi . z :τ, τ2}`
Γ ;Q ` v2 : int` Γ ` ` : label`
Γ ` `′ : label` pc v ` ` v `′
Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` chmod(v1, v2, `, Q, `′) : stmt`′
[SETV ]
Γ ;Q ` v : (τ var)` Γ ;Q ` e : τ pc unionsq ` v τ
Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` setvar(v, e) : stmtpc [RD ]
Γ, x :σ, y :τ1, z :τ2, cid :intpc, nid :intpc ;P ;Q ; pc ` s : stmtpc′
Γ ;P ` c[σ x]{pc, Q, pi . τ z, λτ y. s}
[Auxiliary notations]
pi ⊗ τ : QR[Q]⊗ σ = σ@Q LT[I]⊗ τ = τ writable(Q, τ) : τ = σ@Q ∨ (τ = σ ∧ |Q| = {h})
readable(Q, τ) : (τ = σ@Q′ ∧ |Q| = |Q′|) ∨ (τ = σ ∧ |Q| = {h})
Figure 10: Typing rules
5.3 Type system
The typing rules of DSR are shown in Figure 10. A program P is well-typed in Γ, written as Γ ` P , if every
reactor declaration r in P is well-typed with respect to Γ and P , written Γ ;P ` r, where P provides the
typing information of reactors.
A reactor declaration is well-typed if its body statement is well-typed. The typing judgment for a
statement s has the form Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s : τ , meaning that s has type τ under the typing environment
Γ ;P ;Q ; pc, where s is replicated on Q, and pc is the program counter label. The typing judgment for
an expression e has the form Γ ;P ;Q ` e : τ , meaning that e has type τ under the typing environment
Γ ;P ;Q. For simplicity, a component in the typing environment of a typing judgment may be omitted if
the component is irrelevant. The notations ` v σ and ` v σ@Q represent ` v `′ if σ = β`′ . Rules (INT),
(CID), (LABEL), (VAR), (LOC), (ADD) and (IF) are standard.
Rule (REACTOR) checks reactor c[v]. Suppose the declaration of c is c[x :σ]{pc, Q, pi . z :τ , λ y :τ . s}.
Then the list of parameters v must have types σ[v/x], where the substitution is necessary because x may
appear in σ. The values of the reactor parameters and the effects of this reactor depend on the reactor value
itself. Thus, ` v σ[v/x] and ` v pc[v/x] are enforced. Since this reactor is replicated onQ′ = Q[v/x], any
data processed by the reactor is observable to the hosts in Q′. The last constraint ensures that the hosts in
Q′ would not leak the data of c[v].
Rule (ARG) checks remote variable 〈c[v].zi, v〉. If the type of c[v] shows that zi has type τi and synthe-
sizer pii, then the values used to initialize zi have type pii ⊗ τi such that they can be synthesized by pii into a
value with type τi. Therefore, the type of 〈c[v].zi, v〉 is (pii ⊗ τi var)` where ` is the label of c[v].
Rule (TV) checks versioned values. If v has type σ, then v@t has type σ@Q where Q is the quorum
system producing this value.
Rules (DEREF) and (ASSI) are largely standard. These two rules need to ensure that the involved
memory reference is accessible on Q. In rule (DEREF), readable(Q, τ) means that data with type τ can be
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generated from the host set of Q. In rule (ASSI), writable(Q, τ) ensures that the reference to be assigned is
replicated on Q. The function base(τ) strips the location part of τ .
Rule (SEQ) checks sequential statement s1; s2. If s1 has type stmtpc1 , then s2 is checked with pc1,
since pc1 is the program counter label when s1 terminates.
Rule (EXEC) checks exec statements. It resembles checking a function call. The constraints pc v τ2
and pc v ` ensure that the reactor to be invoked would not leak the information about the current program
counter.
Rule (CHMD) checks chmod statements. The label `′ is meant to be the new access control label of
〈v1, v2〉. After executing this statement, the program counter label becomes `′, effectively preventing the
following code from running another chmod statement with label ` before 〈v1, v2〉 is invoked. The constraint
` v `′ implies pc v `′, guaranteeing the new program counter label is as restrictive as the current one.
Rule (SETV) is used to check the setvar statement. Value v has type (τ var)`, representing a remote
variable. The value of expression e is used to initialized the remote variable, and thus e has type τ . The
constraint pc unionsq ` v τ is imposed because v and the program counter may affect the value of the remote
variable.
Rule (RD) is used to check reactor declarations. The declaration c[x :σ]{pc, Q, pi . z :τ , λy :τ . s} is
well-typed with respect to Γ and P as long as the reactor body s is well-typed in the typing environment
Γ, x :τ , y :τ1, z :τ2 ;P ;Q ; pc.
This type system satisfies the subject reduction property, which is stated in the subject reduction theorem,
following the definitions of well-typed memories and configurations.
Definition 5.1 (Well-typed memory). M is well-typed in Γ, written Γ ` M, if for any m in dom(Γ) and
any host h and any timestamp t,M[h,m, t] = v and Γ(m) = σ or σ@Q imply Γ ` v : σ.
Definition 5.2 (Well-typed environment). E is well-typed in Γ and P , written Γ ;P ` E , if for any closure
〈c[v], η, `, t,A, ∗〉 in E and any x ∈ dom(A), ` A(x) : τ where τ is the type of x based on Γ and c[v], and
for any µ in E , we have Γ ;P ` µ, which means the contents of µ are well-typed. The inference rules for
Γ ;P ` µ are standard:
[M-EXEC ]
Γ ;P ` c[v] : reactor{pc′, pi . z :τ1, τ2}
` v1 : τ1
Γ ;P ` [exec 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, v1,Q, t] [M-CHMD ]
Γ ;P ` c[v] : reactor{pc′, pi . z :τ1, τ2}
Γ ;P ` [chmod 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, `,Q, t]
[M-SETV ]
Γ ;P ` 〈c[v].z, η〉 : (τ var)` ` v1 : τ
Γ ;P ` [setvar 〈c[v].z, η〉 :: v1, t]
Definition 5.3 (Well-typed configuration). 〈Θ, M, E〉 is well-typed in Γ andP , written Γ ;P ` 〈Θ, M, E〉,
if Γ ` M, and Γ ;P ` E , and for any 〈s, t, h, c[v], η〉 in Θ, Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s : τ .
Lemma 5.1 (Expression subject reduction). Suppose Γ ` 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v, and Γ ;Q ` e : τ , and Γ `M . Then
Γ ;Q ` v : τ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v.
• Case (E1). In this case, e is !m, and τ is Γ(m), and v isM(m). If Γ(m) = int`, thenM(m) = n
while M [m] = n@t, and Γ ;Q ` n : int`. Otherwise, Γ(m) = int`@Q, and M(m) = M [m] =
n@t. We have Γ ;Q ` n@t : int`@Q.
• Case (E2). By induction, Γ ;Q ` vi : int`i for i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, Γ ;Q ` v1 + v2 : int`1unionsq`2 .
Lemma 5.2 (Substitution). Suppose Γ, x : τ ` s : τ ′, and Γ ` v : τ . Then Γ ` s[v/x] : τ ′[v/x].
23
Proof. By induction on the structure of s.
Lemma 5.3 (Subject reduction). Suppose Γ ` 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′, Ω′, t′〉, and Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s : τ
and Γ `M,Ω. Then Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s′ : τ and Γ `M ′,Ω′.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′, Ω′, t′〉. Here we only show the cases
(S1) and (S7). Other cases are similar.
• Case (S1). By rule (ASSI), Γ ;Q ` m : (τ ref)` and Γ ;Q ` e : τ . By Lemma 5.1, Γ ;Q ` v : τ .
Therefore, Γ `M [m 7→ v@t].
• Case (S7). Suppose the type of c[v] is reactor{pc′,Q′, pi . τz, τ1}. By Lemma 5.1, Γ ;Q ` v1 : τ1.
Therefore, the new exec message is well-typed, and Γ ` Ω′.
Theorem 5.1 (Subject reduction). Suppose Γ ;P ` 〈Θ, M, E〉, and Γ ;P ` 〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉.
Then Γ ;P ` 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉.
• Case (G1). The evaluation step is derived from 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′, Ω′, t′〉 on host h, and
M′ =M[h 7→t M ′]. SinceM ′ andM are well-typed,M′ is also well-typed. If Ω′ = Ω, then E ′ = E
is well-typed. Otherwise, Ω′ = Ω ∪ {µ} where µ is well-typed, and E ′ = E [messages(h) 7→+ µ].
Therefore, E ′ is well-typed.
• Case (M1). In this case, we only need to prove that the newly created thread is well-typed. Since
Γ ` v1 : τ1. By Γ ` v1 : τ1[v/x], we have Γ′ ` A′. By Lemma 5.2, Γ′ ` s[A′] : τ ′.
• Case (M2). In this case, only the access control label of a closure is changed, which does not affect
the well-typedness of the closure.
• Case (M3). In this case, we need to prove thatA[zi 7→ v] is well-typed. By the run-time type checking
in rule (M3), we have Γ ` v : τi[v/x]. Furthermore, A is well-typed. Thus, A[zi 7→ v] is well-typed.
• Case (A1). By the premise Γ ` v : Γ(m) in rule (A1).
• Case (A2). By the premise Γ ` µ.
• Case (A3). The statement abort is considered well-typed.
6 Noninterference
The noninterference results of DSR are concerned with confidentiality and integrity. Intuitively, confidential-
ity noninterference means that high-confidentiality inputs do not interfere with low-confidentiality outputs;
integrity noninterference means that low-integrity inputs do not interfere with high-integrity outputs.
Unlike a trusted single-machine platform, a distributed system may be under active attacks launched
from bad hosts. Possible active attacks are formalized by the evaluation rules (A1)–(A3). Since we ignore
timing channels, the availability attack in rule (A3) does not produce any observable effects, and is irrelevant
to confidentiality or integrity noninterference. The attacks in rules (A1) and (A2) only produce low-integrity
effects. Thus, intuitively those attacks do not affect the integrity noninterference property. For confidential-
ity, the attacks may be relevant because they may affect low-integrity low-confidentiality data, and generate
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[VE1 ] v ≈ v [VE2 ] none ≈ v [VE3 ]
t1 = t2 ⇒ v1 ≈ v2
v1@t1 ≈ v2@t2
[MSE1 ]
P (c[v]) = c{pc′, Q, pi . z :τ , λx :τ1.s} ∀i. ζ(τ1i)⇒ v1i ≈ v2i
[exec 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, v1,Q, t] ≈ζ [exec 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, v2,Q, t]
[MSE2 ]
ζ(pc)⇒ `1 = `2
[chmod 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, `1,Q, t] ≈ζ [chmod 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, `2,Q, t]
[MSE3 ]
ζ(c[v].z)⇒ v1 ≈ v2
[setvar 〈c[v].z, η〉 :: v1, t] ≈ζ [setvar 〈c[v].z, η〉 :: v2, t]
[ME ]
∀h1, h2,m, t. ζ(m,h1) ∧ ζ(m,h2) ∧ t ≤ min(T1(h1, t), T2(h2, t))⇒M1[h1,m, t] =M2[h2,m, t]
∀h1, h2,m. ζ(m,h1) ∧ ζ(m,h2)⇒M1[h1,m, t0] ≈M2[h2,m, t0]
Γ ` 〈M1, T1〉 ≈ζ 〈M2, T2〉
[CE ]
varmap (P, c[v]) ` A1 ≈ζ A2 ζ(c[v])⇒ t1 = t2
P ` 〈c[v], η, `1,A1, t1, ∗〉 ≈ζ 〈c[v], η, `2,A2, t2, ∗〉
[EE ]
∀h1, h2. ∀t ≤ min(T1(h1, t), T2(h2, t)).
((∃j ∈ {1, 2}. 〈hj , h′j , µj〉 ∈ Ej .messages(hj , ∗, [∗ :: ∗, t]) ∧ ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. ζ(µj , hi))⇒
(∀i ∈ {1, 2}. Ei.messages(hi, ∗, [∗ :: ∗, t]) = 〈hi, h′i, µi〉) ∧ µ1 ≈ζ µ2
∀h1, h2. ∀〈c[v], η〉. ζ(c[v], h1) ∧ ζ(c[v], h2) ⇒ P ` E1.closure(h1, c[v], η) ≈ζ E2.closure(h2, c[v], η)
P ` 〈E1, T1〉 ≈ζ 〈E2, T2〉
[TE ]
t1 ≈ t2
〈s1, t1, h1, c[v], η〉 ≈ζ 〈s2, t2, h2, c[v], η〉
[TPE ]
∀t′ ≤ t. ∀h1, h2. (∀i ∈ {1, 2}. ζ(t′, hi) ∧Θi(hi, t′) = θi)⇒ θ1 ≈ζ θ2
(∀t′ < t. (∃h. ∃j ∈ {1, 2}. Θj(h, t′) = θ ∧ ζ(t′, h)) ⇒ ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. stableζ(Θi, Q, t′)
t ` Θ1 ≈ζ Θ2
[SE ]
∀i ∈ {1, 2}. Ti = timestamps(Θi, Ei, ζ) Γ ` 〈M1, T1〉 ≈ζ 〈M2, T2〉 Γ ` 〈E1, T1〉 ≈ζ 〈E2, T2〉
min(max(T1, ζ), max(T2, ζ)) ` Θ1 ≈ζ Θ2
Γ ` 〈Θ1, M1, E1〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ2, M2, E2〉
[Auxiliary definitions]
∃H. (∀hi ∈ H. ζ(t, h) ⇒ Θ(hi, t) = 〈si, ti, hi, c[v], η〉 ∧ Γ ;Q ; pci ` si : τ ∧ ¬ζ(pci) ∧ ∃W ∈ Q. W ⊆ H)
stableζ(Θ, Q, t)
Figure 11: ζ-Equivalence relation
different low-confidentiality outputs even with the same low-confidentiality inputs. However, these are not
effective confidentiality attacks because differences in low-confidentiality outputs are due to those attacks
rather than the differences in high-confidentiality inputs. Therefore, we assume that attackers would not
affect low-confidentiality data when the confidentiality noninterference is under consideration.
This section formalizes the notions of confidentiality and integrity noninterference, and proves that a
well-typed DSR program has the noninterference properties.
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6.1 ζ-Equivalence
Another way to state confidentiality noninterference is that equivalence low-confidentiality inputs always
generate equivalent low-confidentiality outputs. Similarly, integrity noninterference means that equivalent
high-integrity inputs generate equivalent high-integrity outputs. Abstractly, a noninterference property can
be expressed as the preservation of equivalence between the program states that satisfies a ζ condition. As
for confidentiality and integrity nonintereferences, the ζ condition intuitively means “low-confidentiality”
and “high-integrity”, respectively. Formally, for confidentiality, ζ(x) denotes C(x) ≤ lA if x is a label, and
C(label(x)) ≤ lA, if x is a program term such as type τ , reference m, host h, timestamp t and message µ.
The label of term x is defined as follows:
• label(h) is the label specified on host h.
• label(τ) is `, if τ = β` or τ = β`@Q.
• label(µ) is pc if µ is an exec or chmodmessage and pc is the program counter label of µ, and label(µ)
is ` if µ is a setvar message and ` is the label of the remote variable targeted by µ.
• label(t) is the last pc component of the global part of t.
• label(c[v]) is the program counter label of c[v].
For integrity, ζ(x) denotes C(x) ≤ lA or C(label(x)) ≤ lA. Whether a term x satisfies the ζ condition
may depend on the host where x resides. For instance, any term on a low-integrity host is also low-integrity.
In general, whether term x on host h satisfies ζ can be determined byζ(label(x)u label(h)), which is written
as ζ(x, h).
The key issue in formalizing the noninterference property is to define the ζ-equivalence relation be-
tween program states, including thread pools, memories, and environments. These equivalence relations are
formally defined by inference rules in Figure 11.
Rules (VE1)–(VE3) define an equivalence relation (≈) between values. Intuitively, v1 ≈ v2 means they
may be used in the same way and in the same execution. More concretely, v1 and v2 may be assigned to the
replicas of a memory reference, and they may appear as the same component in the replicas of a message.
Rule (VE1) is standard. Rule (VE2) says that none is equivalent to any value v because none represents an
unavailable value that cannot be used in any computation to generate observable effects. Rule (VE3) says
that two versioned v1@t1 and v2@t2 are equivalent if t1 = t2 implies v1 ≈ v2. Two versioned values with
different timestamps are considered equivalent, because they may be used in the same way and in the same
execution.
Rules (MSE1)–(MSE3) define the ζ-equivalence between messages. Rule (MSE1) says that two exec
messages [exec 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, v1,Q, t] and [exec 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, v2,Q, t] are ζ-equivalent if any two cor-
responding arguments v1i and v2i are equivalent on condition that ζ(τ1i) holds. Intuitively, ¬ζ(τ1i) means
that values with type τ1i can be distinguishable. Rules (MSE2) and (MSE2) are interpreted similarly.
Rule (ME) defines memory ζ-equivalence. Intuitively, two global memoriesM1 andM2 are considered
ζ-equivalent with respect to the typing assignment Γ, if for any hosts h1 and h2, any reference m, and any
time t, ζ(m,h1) and ζ(m,h2) imply M1[h1,m, t] ≈ M[h2,m, t]. However, with the knowledge of the
thread timestamps, M1 and M2 may be distinguishable if M1[h1,m, t] = n and M2[h2,m, t] = none,
becauseM2[h2,m, t] = none can be determined by reading the most recent version of m by t on host h2.
If there exists a thread on h2 with a timestamp t′ such that t′ ≈ t (the global parts of t and t′ are equal)
and t ≤ t′, thenM1 andM2 must belong to different executions. Therefore, the ζ-equivalence ofM1 and
M2 should be considered with respect to the timing information, which is captured by a timing map T that
maps a host h to the set of timestamps of the threads on h. Let T (h, t) be the timestamp t′ in T [h] such that
t ≈ t′. ThenM1[h1,m, t] andM2[h2,m, t] need to be equal if t ≤ min(T1(h1, t), T2(h2, t)), which means
the two threads on hosts h1 and h2 have reached time t. Therefore, if m is updated at time t in one thread,
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then m should also be updated at t in another thread. Otherwise, the two threads, along withM1 andM2
belong to different executions. Rule (ME) also requires that M1 and M2 have ζ-equivalent states at the
initial time t0 = 〈〉. The second premise of rule (ME) saysM1[h1,m, t0] andM2[h2,m, t0] are equivalent
if ζ(m,hi) holds for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Rule (CE) defines the equivalence relationship between reactor closures. Two closures are equivalent
if they have the same closure reference 〈c[v], η〉 and have ζ-equivalent variable records. In this rule, the
notation varmap(P, c[v]) represents the local typing assignment Γ′ of c[v] with respect to P , mapping local
variables of c[v] to types. The notation Γ′ ` A1 ≈ζ A2 means that for any z in dom(Γ′), ζ(Γ′(z)) implies
A1(z) ≈ A2(z).
Rule (EE) defines the equivalence relationship between environments. Intuitively, two environments
are equivalent if the corresponding (with the same timestamp) messages in the two environments are ζ-
equivalent, and the corresponding (with the same reference) closures are ζ-equivalent. Like in rule (ME),
we need to take into account the case that there exists a message at time t in one environment, but there does
not exist such a message in the other environment. Similarly, the ζ-equivalence between two environments
E1 and E2 are considered with respect to the corresponding timing maps T1 and T2. Formally, given two
hosts h1 and h2, and some timestamp t that is less than or equal to Ti(h1, t), if there exists a message µj
in Ej such that µj has the timestamp t and the program counter label pcµj such that ζ(pcµj ,hi) holds for
i ∈ {1, 2}, then in both E1 and E2, exactly one message (µ1 and µ2, respectively) is sent at time t, and
µ1 ≈ζ µ2. Furthermore, for any hosts h1 and h2 and any closure reference 〈c[v], η〉, if ζ(c[v], h1) and
ζ(c[v], h2), then the closures identified by 〈c[v], η〉 on hosts h1 and h2 are ζ-equivalent.
Rule (TE) defines the equivalence between threads. Two threads are equivalent if they correspond to the
same reactor instance, and their base timestamps are the same.
Rule (TPE) defines ζ-equivalence between thread pools. Two thread pools Θ1 and Θ2 are equivalent
with respect to their corresponding timing states T1 and T2, written 〈Θ1, T1〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ2, T2〉, if two conditions
hold. First, any two hosts h1 and h2, and any timestamp t′ satisfying t′ ≤ t where t is the smaller of
the largest timestamps satisfying ζ(t) in T1 and T2, if ζ(t′, hi) and there exists a thread θi on hi and with
timestamp ti such that ti ≈ t′ in Θi, then θ1 ≈ζ θ2. Second, for any timestamp t′ less than t, if there exists
a thread at t′ in either Θ1 or Θ2, then the threads at time t′ are stable with respect to the quorum system Q
and the condition ζ in both Θ1 and Θ2. Intuitively, these two conditions ensure that both Θ1 and Θ2 have
reached t, and the corresponding threads before t are equivalent.
Rule (SE) defines the equivalence relationship between system configurations. Two configurations
are considered equivalent if their corresponding components are equivalent with respect to their timing
states, which are computed by the function timestamps(Θ, E , ζ). Suppose T = timestamps(Θ, E , ζ). Then
T [h, t] = t′ means that one of the following cases occurs. First, there exists a thread on h with timestamp
t′ such that t′ ≈ t, and for any thread on h with timestamp t′′, t′′ ≈ t implies t′′ ≤ t′. Second, there exists
a closure on h with timestamp t′ and access control label ` such that ζ(`) and t′ ≈ t, and there is no thread
on h with timestamp t′′ such that t′′ ≈ t. The notation current-time(T , ζ) is the most recent timestamp t
such that T [h, t] = t and ζ(t, h). Intuitively, min(max(T1, ζ), max(T2, ζ)) is the current timestamp of the
lagging one of the two configuration.
6.2 Preventing races
In DSR, a race is used to refer to the scenario that two threads with different closure references are running at
the same timestamp or sending messages with the same message head. A race makes it possible for attackers
to choose to endorse the operations of one of the two racing threads, and affect the execution that they are not
allowed to affect. Furthermore, message races increases the complexity of maintaining consistency between
reactor replicas. Therefore, it is desired to prevent races in DSR programs.
The evaluation rule (S7) of DSR halts the current thread after sending out an execmessage. As a result,
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if the execution of a distributed program starts from a single program point, then threads generated from
normal execution can be serialized, and so can the memory accesses by those threads.
We now discuss how to prevent the races between messages. The races between chmod messages are
harmless because chmod messages with different labels are processed separately, and the type system of
DSR ensures that no two different chmod requests would be issued by the same thread at the same program
counter label. As for preventing the races between other messages, our approach is to enforce the following
linearity constraints:
• A closure reference can be invoked by at most one reactor instance.
• A remote variable can be initialized by at most one reactor instance.
These constraints can be enforced by a static program analysis, which tracks the communication terms (in-
cluding used by each reactor and ensures those terms to be used only once. The communication terms
include reactor names, closure references, context identifiers and remote variables. Given a statement s and
the typing assignment Γ for that statement, let RV (s,Γ) represent the multi-set of communication terms
appearing in the exec and setvar statements in s. Note that RV (s,Γ) is a multi-set so that multiple occur-
rences of the same value can be counted. Given a reactor declaration r = c[x :σ]{pc, Q, pi . z :τ , λy :τ .s},
let RV (r,Γ) denote the multi-set of communication port terms appearing in r with respect to Γ. Then we
have
RV (r,Γ) = RV (s, Γ, x :σ, y :τ1, z :τ2)
Given a program P such that Γ ` P , we can ensure that there are no races between messages by by
enforcing the following three conditions:
• RV1. For any r in P , RV (r,Γ) is a set.
• RV2. If 〈c[v].z, v〉 ∈ RV (r,Γ), then v is either cid or nid, and for any other r′ in P , 〈c[v].z, cid〉 6∈
RV (r′,Γ). Furthermore, if v is cid, then c has no reactor parameters, and v contains no variables.
• RV3. If 〈c[v], v〉 ∈ RV (r,Γ), and r may be invoked by c directly or indirectly, then v is nid.
The first condition ensures that a reactor can perform at most one operation on a communication term.
The second condition ensures that only one reactor instance is allowed to refer to 〈c[v].z, cid〉 in its body.
According to (RV2), if 〈c[v].z, cid〉 appears in reactor c′, then c′ has no parameters. Therefore, only one
reactor instance 〈c′, η〉 can use 〈c[v].z, η〉 without receiving the variable from its caller. By (RV1), 〈c′, η〉
can either initialize the variable or pass it on to another unique reactor instance, ensuring that only one
reactor may initialize 〈c[v].z, η〉. The third condition (RV3) ensures that no two threads with different
closure references can invoke the same reactor with the same context identifier. We use the notation Γ  P
to denote that a program P is well-typed in Γ and satisfies (RV1)–(RV3).
6.3 The DSR* language
To facilitate proving the noninterference results of DSR, we introduce a bracket construct that syntactically
captures the differences between executions of the same program on different inputs. The extended language
is called DSR*. Except for proving noninterference, the DSR* language also helps reasoning concurrent
execution of threads on different hosts.
Intuitively, each machine configuration in DSR* encodes multiple DSR local configurations that capture
the states of concurrent threads on different hosts. The operational semantics of DSR* is consistent with
that of DSR in the sense that the evaluation of a DSR* configuration is equivalent to the evaluation of
DSR configurations encoded by the DSR* configuration. The type system of DSR* can be instantiated to
ensure that a well-typed DSR* configuration satisfies certain invariant. Then the subject reduction result of
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DSR* implies that the invariant is preserved during evaluation. In particular, the invariant may represent
the ζ-equivalence relation corresponding to a noninterference result. For example, a DSR* configuration
may encode two DSR configurations, and the invariant may be that the low-confidentiality parts of the two
configurations are equivalent. Then the subject reduction result of DSR* implies that the preservation of the
ζ-equivalence between two DSR local configurations. This proof technique was first used by Pottier and
Simonet to prove the noninterference result of a security-typed ML-like language [18].
6.3.1 Syntax extensions
The syntax extensions of DSR* are bracket constructs, which are composed of a set of DSR terms and used
to capture the differences between DSR configurations.
Values v ::= . . . | (v1, . . . , vn)
Statements s ::= . . . | (s1, . . . , sn)
The bracket constructs cannot be nested, so the subterms of a bracket construct must be DSR terms. Given
a DSR* statement s, let bsci represent the DSR statements that s encodes. The projection functions satisfy
b(s1, . . . , sn)ci = si and are homomorphisms on other statement and expression forms. A DSR* memory
M incorporates multiple DSR local memory snapshots.
Since a DSR* term effectively encodes multiple DSR terms, the evaluation of a DSR* term can be pro-
jected into multiple DSR evaluations. An evaluation step of a bracket statement (s1, . . . , sn) is an evaluation
step of any si, and si can only access the corresponding projection of the memory. Thus, the configuration
of DSR* has an index i ∈ {•, 1, . . . , n} that indicates whether the term to be evaluated is a subterm of
a bracket term, and if so, which branch of a bracket the term belongs to. For example, the configuration
〈s, M, Ω, t〉1 means that s belongs to the first branch of a bracket, and s can only access the first projection
of M. We write “〈s, M, Ω, t〉” for “〈s, M, Ω, t〉•”.
The operational semantics of DSR* is shown in Figure 12. Since DSR* is used to analyze the local
evaluation steps of DSR, only evaluation rules for statements are presented. An evaluation step of a DSR*
statement is denoted by 〈s, M, Ω, t〉i 7−→ 〈s′, M′, Ω′, t′〉i. Most evaluation rules are adapted from the
semantics of DSR by indexing each configuration with i. The main change is that memory accesses and
timestamp increments are to be performed on the memory and timestamp projection corresponding to index
i. In rule (S1), the updated memory M′ is M[m 7→i v@btci], where btci is the ith projection of t. Suppose
M[m] = v′. Then M′[m] = (bv′c1, . . . , v@btci, . . . , bv′cn). In DSR*, the local part of a timestamp t may
have the form n, or n, (n1, . . . , nk), which indicates that the execution deviates after local time n. Suppose
t = n, (n1, . . . , nk). Then we have
btci = n, ni
t /i 1 = n, (n1, . . . , ni / 1, . . . , nk)
t .i 1 = n, (n1, . . . , ni . 1, . . . , nk)
t . 1 = n+ 1
where n / 1 = n, 1, and n . 1 = n1, . . . , nk−1 + 1, and n + 1 = n1, . . . , nk + 1. If t = n, then
t /i 1 = n, (, . . . , 1, . . . , ).
There are also new evaluation rules (S11–S14) for manipulating bracket constructs. The following
adequacy and soundness lemmas state that the operational semantics of DSR* is adequate to encode the
execution of multiple DSR terms.
Lemma 6.1 (Projection i). Suppose 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v. Then 〈beci, bMci〉 ⇓ bvci holds for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e.
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[E1 ]
bM(m)ci = v
〈!m, M, t〉i ⇓ v [E2 ]
〈e1, M〉i ⇓ v1 〈e2, M〉i ⇓ v2 v = v1 ⊕ v2
〈e1 + e2, M〉i ⇓ v
[S1 ]
〈e, M〉i ⇓ v
〈m := e, M, Ω, t〉i 7−→ 〈skip, M[m 7→i v@btci], Ω, t+i 1〉i [S2 ]
〈s1, M, Ω, t〉i 7−→ 〈s′1, M′, Ω′, t′〉i
〈s1; s2, M, Ω, t〉i 7−→ 〈s′1; s2, M′, Ω′, t′〉i
[S3 ] 〈skip; s, M, Ω, t〉i 7−→ 〈s, M, Ω, t〉i [S4 ] 〈fi; s, M, t〉i 7−→ 〈s, M, t .i 1〉i
[S5 ]
〈e, M〉i ⇓ n n > 0
〈if e then s1 else s2, M, Ω, t〉i 7−→ 〈s1; fi, M, Ω, t / 1〉i [S6 ]
〈e, M〉i ⇓ n n ≤ 0
〈if e then s1 else s2, M, Ω, t〉i 7−→ 〈s2; fi, M, Ω, t /i 1〉i
[S7 ]
〈e, M〉i ⇓ v1
〈exec(v, v′, pc, Q, e), M, Ω, t〉i 7−→ 〈halt, M, Ω ∪ [v, v′, exec :: t, pc,Q, v1]i, t+i 1〉i
[S8 ] 〈chmod(c[v], n, pc, Q, `), M, Ω, t〉i 7−→ 〈skip, M, Ω ∪ [c[v], η, chmod :: t, pc,Q, `]i, t+i 1〉i
[S9 ] 〈setvar(c[v].n1, n, v), M, Ω, i〉7−→〈skip, M, Ω ∪ [c[v].z, η, setvar :: t, v]i, t+i 1〉i
[S10 ] 〈(skip, . . . , skip), M, t〉 7−→ 〈skip, M, t〉 [S11 ] 〈(fi, . . . , fi), M, t〉 7−→ 〈skip, M, t . 1〉
[S12 ]
〈e, M〉 ⇓ (v1, . . . , vn)
〈if e then s1 else s2, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈(if vi then bs1ci else bs2ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ n), M, Ω, t〉
[S13 ]
〈si, M, Ω, t〉i 7−→ 〈s′i, M′, Ω′, t′〉i
〈(s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn), M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈(s1, . . . , s′i, . . . , sn), M′, Ω′, t′〉
[S14 ] 〈(m1, . . . ,mn) := e, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈(m1 := bec1, . . . ,mn = becn), M, Ω, t〉
Figure 12: The operational semantics of DSR*
Lemma 6.2 (Projection ii). Suppose bMci = Mi and bΩci = Ωi and btci = ti. Then 〈s, M, Ω, t〉i 7−→
〈s′, M′, Ω′, t′〉i if and only if 〈s, Mi, Ωi, ti〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′i , Ω′i, t′i〉 and bM′ci = M ′i and bΩ′ci = Ω′i and
bt′ci = t′i
Proof. By induction on the structure of s.
Lemma 6.3 (Expression adequacy). Suppose 〈ei, Mi〉 ⇓ vi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and there exists a DSR*
configuration 〈e, M〉 such that beci = ei and bMci =Mi. Then 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v such that bvci = vi.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e.
Definition 6.1 (Local run). A local run 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→∗ 〈s′, M′, Ω′, t′〉 represents consecutive local eval-
uation steps: 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈s1, M1, Ω1, t1〉, 〈s1, M′1, Ω1, t1〉 7−→ 〈s2, M2, Ω2, t2〉, . . ., 〈sn, Mn, Ωn, tn〉 7−→
〈s′, M′, Ω′, t′〉, where M′i and Mi may differ because the execution of other threads or active attacks may
change the local memory snapshot.
Lemma 6.4 (One-step adequacy). Suppose Ei = 〈si, Mi, Ωi, ti〉 7−→ 〈s′i, M ′i , Ω′i, t′i〉 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
and there exists a DSR* configuration 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 such that b〈s, M, Ω, t〉ci = 〈si, Mi, Ωi, ti〉. Then there
exists E = 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→∗ 〈s′, M′, Ω′, t′〉 such that for any i, bEci  Ei, and for some j, bEcj ≈ Ej .
Proof. By induction on the structure of s.
• s is skip. Then si is also skip and cannot be further evaluated. Therefore, the lemma is correct
because its premise does not hold.
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• s is v := e. In this case, si is bvci := beci, and 〈bvci := beci, Mi, Ωi, ti〉 7−→ 〈skip, Mi[mi 7→ti
vi], Ωi, ti + 1〉 where mi = bvci and 〈beci, M1〉 ⇓ vi. By Lemma 6.3, 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v′ and bv′ci = vi.
If v = m, then 〈v := e, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈skip, M [m 7→t v′], Ω, t + 1〉. Since bMci = Mi, we have
bM [m 7→t v]ci = Mi[m 7→ bvci]. In addition, we have bs′ci = s′i = skip. If v = (m1, . . . ,mn),
then v = (m1, . . . ,mn), and 〈v := e, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈(m1 := v1, . . . ,mn := vn), M, Ω, t〉 7−→
〈(skip, . . . ,mn := vn), M[m1 7→1 v1@btc1], Ω, t+1 1〉.
• s is if e then s′′1 else s′′2 . By Lemma 6.3, 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v. If v = n, 〈s, M〉 7−→ 〈s′′j , M〉 for some j in
{1, 2}, and si is if beci then bs′′1ci else bs′′2ci. Therefore, 〈si, Mi〉 7−→ 〈bs′′j ci, Mi〉 holds because
〈beci, bMci〉 ⇓ n. If v = (n1, . . . , nk), then 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→∗ 〈(bs′′j1c1, . . . , bs′′jkck), M, Ω, t〉
where j1, . . . , jk ∈ {1, 2}. In addition, we have 〈e, Mi〉 ⇓ ni. Therefore, 〈si, Mi, Ωi, ti〉 7−→
〈s′′ji , Mi, Ωi, ti / 1〉.
• s is s′′1; s′′2 . In this case, si = bs′′1ci; bs′′2ci. There are four cases:
– bs′′1ci is not skip or up for any i, then the lemma holds by induction.
– s′′1 is skip or (skip, . . . , skip), then it is clear 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→∗ 〈s′′2, M, Ω, t〉. Correspond-
ingly, 〈si, Mi, Ωi, ti〉 7−→ 〈bs′′2ci, Mi, Ωi, ti〉.
– s′′1 is up or (up, . . . , up), then 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→∗ 〈s′′2, M, Ω, t+1.〉, while 〈si, Mi, Ωi, ti〉 7−→
〈bs′′2ci, Mi, Ωi, ti + 1.〉. In addition, bt+ 1.ci = btci + 1. = ti + 1..
– s′′1 is (s11, . . . , s1n), and some s1j is not skip or up. Then 〈s1j , M, Ω, t〉j 7−→ 〈s′1j , M′, Ω′, t′〉j
and 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈(s11, . . . , s′1j , . . . , s1n); s′′2, M′, Ω′, t′〉. By Lemma 6.2, 〈s1j , Mj , Ωj , tj〉 7−→
〈s′1j , M ′j , Ω′j , t′j〉.
• s is exec(v, v′, pc, Q, e). Then 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→ 〈skip, M, Ω∪{µ}, t+1〉while µ = [v, v′, exec ::
t, pc,Q, v1] and 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v1. Since bsci = si, it is easy to show that bµci = µi and 〈si, Mi, Ωi, ti〉 7−→
〈skip, Mi, Ωi ∪ {µi}, ti + 1〉, since by Lemma 6.3, 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v1 implies 〈beci, Mi〉 ⇓ bv1ci.
• s is chmod(v1, v2, pc, Q, `) or setvar(v1, v2, v). By the same argument of the above case.
• s is (s1, . . . , sn). By rule (S13) and Lemma 6.2.
Lemma 6.5 (Adequacy). Suppose Ei = 〈si, Mi, Ωi, ti〉 7−→∗ 〈s′i, M ′i , Ω′i, t′i〉 for all i in {1, . . . , n}, and
there exists a DSR* configuration 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 such that b〈s, M, Ω, t〉ci = 〈si, Mi, Ωi, ti〉. Then there
exists E = 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→∗ 〈s′, M′, Ω′, t′〉, such that for any i, bEci  Ei, and there exists j such that
bEcj ≈ Ej .
Proof. By induction on the number of steps of E1 through En. If 〈sj , Mj , Ωj , tj〉 = 〈s′j , M ′j , Ω′j , t′j〉 for
some j, then the lemma holds immediately. Otherwise, for all i, 〈si, Mi, Ωi, ti〉 7−→ 〈s′′i , M ′′i , Ω′′i , t′′i 〉 7−→∗
〈s′i, M ′, Ω′i, t′i〉. By Lemma 6.4, there exists E′ = 〈s, M, Ω, t〉 7−→∗ 〈s′′, M′′, Ω′′, t′′〉 such that bEci 
〈si, Mi, Ωi, ti〉 7−→ 〈s′′i , M ′′i , Ω′′i , t′′i 〉, and for some j, bEcj ≈ 〈sj , Mj , Ωj , tj〉 7−→ 〈s′′j , M ′′j , Ω′′j , t′′j 〉.
Let E′′i = Ei − bE′ci. By induction, there exists E′′ = 〈s′′, M′′, Ω′′, t′′〉 7−→∗ 〈s′, M′, Ω′, t′〉 such that
bE′′ci  E′′i and for some j, bE′′cj ≈ E′′j . Then E = E′ :: E′′ is a run satisfying the lemma.
6.3.2 Typing rules
The type system of DSR* is shown in Figure 13. The typing judgment has the forms Γ ;P ` e : τ and
Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s : τ , where Q is the quorum system on which e or s is replicated. Except for additional
rules for bracket terms, this type system is similar to the type system of DSR.
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[BV1 ]
Γ ` vi : τ
¬ζ(τ) or ∀i. vi = v ∨ vi = none
Γ ` (v1, . . . , vn) : τ [BV2 ]
Γ ` vi : τ τ = σ@Q
K(v1, . . . , vn)
Γ ` (v1, . . . , vn) : τ [BS ]
bΓci ;P ;Q ;bpc′ci ` si : bτci
¬ζ(pc′)
Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` (s1, . . . , sn) : τ
[M-EXEC ]
Γ ;P ` c[v] : reactor{pc′, pi . z :τ1, τ2}
` v1 : τ1 i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ⇒ ¬ζ(pc)
Γ ;P ` [exec 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, v1,Q, t]i [M-CHMD ]
Γ ;P ` c[v] : reactor{pc′, pi . z :τ1, τ2}
` ` : label`′ ¬ζ(`′)
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ⇒ ¬ζ(pc)
Γ ;P ` [chmod 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, `,Q, t]i
[M-SETV ]
` c[v].η1 : τ var ` v1 : τ i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ⇒ ¬ζ(pc)
Γ ;P ` [setvar 〈c[v].z, η〉 :: v1, t]i
Figure 13: Typing rules of DSR*
The bracket constructs captures the differences between DSR terms. As a result, any effect of a bracket
construct does not satisfy ζ. Let ¬ζ(x) denote that x does not satisfy ζ. Rule (BV1) says that a bracket
value v is well-typed if its type satisfies ¬ζ, or all the non-none components in v are equal, which implies
that the components of v are equivalent as none is equivalent to any value. An additional rule (BV2) may be
used to check a bracket value with a located type σ@Q. In this case, the components of the bracket value are
versioned values, which are treated differently because values with different timestamps may be equivalent.
Rule (BV2) relies on an abstract functionK(v1, . . . , vn) to determine whether a bracket of versioned values
can have a type satisfying ζ.
Rule (BS) says that a bracket statement (s1, . . . , sn) is well-typed if every si is well-typed with respect
to a program counter label not satisfying ζ.
In DSR*, a memory M is well-typed with respect to the typing assignment Γ, written Γ ` M, if Γ `
M(m) : Γ(m) holds for any m in dom(M). If M[m] = (v1@t1, . . . , vn@tn) and Γ(m) = σ, then M(m) =
(v1, . . . , vn). The message set Ω is well-typed with respect to Γ and P , written Γ ;P ` Ω, if any message µ
in Ω is well-typed with respect to Γ and P .
An important constraint that ζ needs to satisfy is that ¬ζ(`) implies ¬ζ(` unionsq `′) for any `′. The purpose
of this constraint is best illustrated by an example. In DSR*, if expression e is evaluated to a bracket value
(v1, . . . , vn), statement if e then s1 else s2 would be reduced to a bracket statement (s′1, . . . , s′n), where
s′i is either bs1ci or bs2ci. To show (s′1, . . . , s′n) is well-typed, we need to show that each s′i is well-typed
under a program-counter label that satisfying ¬ζ, and we can show it by using the constraint on ζ. Suppose
e has type int`, then we know that s′i is well-typed under the program counter label pc unionsq `. Furthermore,
¬ζ(`) holds because the result of e is a bracket value. Thus, by the constraint that ¬ζ(`) implies ¬ζ(`unionsq `′),
we have ¬ζ(pc unionsq `).
6.3.3 Subjection reduction
In this section, we prove the subject reduction theorem of DSR*.
Lemma 6.6. Suppose Γ ;P ` e : τ , and Γ ` M, and 〈e, M〉i ⇓ v. Then Γ ;P ` v : τ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 〈e, M〉i ⇓ v.
• Cases E1. Since Γ ` M, we have Γ ` M(m) : τ . By rules (BV1) and (BV2), ` bM(m)ci : τ .
• Case E2. By induction, Γ ;Q ` vi : τ for i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, Γ ;Q ` v : τ .
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Theorem 6.1 (Subject reduction). Suppose Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s : τ , and Γ ` M, and Γ ;P ` Ω, and
〈s, M, Ω, t〉i 7−→ 〈s′, M′, Ω′, t′〉i, and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} implies that ¬ζ(pc). Then Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s′ : τ ,
and Γ ` M′, and Γ ;P ` Ω′.
Proof. By induction on the derivation step 〈s, M, Ω, t〉i 7−→ 〈s′, M ′, Ω′, t′〉i.
• Case S1. In this case, s is m := e; τ is stmtpc; s′ is skip. We have Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` skip : stmtpc.
By (S1), M′ is M[m 7→i v@t]. By Lemma 6.6, we have Γ ` v : Γ(m). If i is •, then M′(m) is v or
v@t according to Γ(m), and in either case, the type of M′(m) is Γ(m). Otherwise, ¬ζ(Γ(m)) holds,
and thus M′(m) has type Γ(m) according to rule (BV1).
• Case S2. By typing rule (SEQ), Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s1 : stmtpc′ and Γ ;P ;Q ; pc′ ` s2 : stmtpc′′ . By
induction, Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s′1 : stmtpc′ . Therefore, Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s′1; s2 : stmtpc′′ . By induction,
Γ ` M′ and Γ ;P ` Ω′.
• Case S3. s is skip; s′. By rule (SEQ), Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s′ : τ .
• Case S5. s is if e then s1 else s2. By typing rule (IF), Γ ;P ;Q ; pc unionsq `e ` s1 : τ , which implies
Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` s1 : τ .
• Case S6. By the same argument as case (S5).
• Case S7. In this case, s is exec(c[v], η, pc, Q, e). By Lemma 6.6, Γ ;Q ` v1 : τ1, where τ1 are the
types of the corresponding arguments of c[v]. Thus Γ ` [exec 〈c[v], η〉 :: pc, v1,Q, t].
• Case S8. By the same argument as case (S7).
• Case S9. By Lemma 6.6.
• Case S10. By (BS), τ is stmtpc. Therefore, Γ ;P ;Q ; pc ` skip : τ .
• Case S12. In this case, s is if e then s1 else s2 and 〈e, M〉 ⇓ (v1, . . . , vn). By the typing rule (IF),
Γ ;Q ` e : int`. By Lemma 6.6, Γ ;Q ` (v1, . . . , vn) : int`. By the typing rule (BV1), we have
¬ζ(`), which implies ¬ζ(pcunionsq `). Moreover, by rule (IF), Γ ;Q ; pcunionsq ` ` bsjci : τ for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and j ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, by rule (BS), Γ ;Q ; pc ` s′ : τ .
• Case S13. By induction, Γ ` M′ and Γ ;P ` Ω′, and Γ ;P ;Q ; pc′ ` s′i : τ . Therefore, Γ ;P ;Q ; pc `
s′ : τ .
• Case S14. s′ is (m1 := bec1, . . . ,mn := becn). Suppose Γ ;P ` (m1, . . . ,mn) : (int` ref)`′ . By
(BV1), ¬ζ(`′), which implies ¬ζ(`). As a result, Γ ;P ;Q ; ` ` s′ : τ .
6.4 Noninterference proof
Let Θ0 represent the initial thread pool that is empty, and E0 represent the initial environment that contains
only invocation messages for the starting reactor c (having no arguments) at time t0 = 〈〉.
Lemma 6.7 (Noninterference). Suppose Γ  P , andEi = 〈Θ0, Mi, E0〉 7−→∗ 〈Θ′i, M′i, E ′i〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}
If Γ ;P ` 〈Θ0, M1, E0〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ0, M2, E0〉, then Γ ;P ` 〈Θ′1, M′1, E ′1〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ′2, M′2, E ′2〉.
Proof. By induction on |E1|+ |E2|. The base case is trivial. Without loss of generality, suppose |E1| ≤ |E2|
and 〈Θ, Mi, E〉 7−→∗ 〈Θ′′i , M′′i , E ′′i 〉 7−→ 〈Θ′i, M′i, E ′i〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Let T ′i = timestamps(Θ′i) and
T ′′i = timestamps(Θ′′i ). By induction, Γ ;P ` 〈Θ′′i , M′′1, E ′′1 〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ′2, M′2, E ′2〉. Then we need to show
that Γ ;P ` 〈Θ′1, M′1, E ′1〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ′2, M′2, E ′2〉 holds for all cases of 〈Θ′′i , M′′1, E ′′1 〉 7−→ 〈Θ′1, M′1, E ′1〉:
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• Case (G1). In this case, the evaluation step is derived from 〈s, M ′′1 , Ω′′1, t′′1〉 7−→ 〈s′, M ′1, Ω′1, t′1〉 on
some host h1. We need to prove that the local state of h1 in 〈Θ′1, M′1, E ′1〉 is still ζ-equivalent to the
local state of any host h2 in 〈Θ′2, M′2, E ′2〉.
By examining rules (S1)–(S9), we only need to consider two cases: (1) M ′′1 = M ′1[m 7→t′′1 v], and
ζ(m,hi) holds for i ∈ {1, 2}; (2) Ω′′1 = Ω′1 ∪ {µ}, and ζ(µ, hi) holds for i ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose one of
the two cases occurs. Consider the local run of the thread at t′1 on host hi: E′i = 〈si, Mi, ∅, t〉 7−→∗
〈s′i, M ′i , Ω′i, t′i〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}. By rule (TPE), the two local runs correspond to the same closure
reference 〈c[v], η〉. Then we can show that si = s[A′i] and Γ′ ` A′1 ≈ζ A′2, where Γ′ is the local
typing assignment for reactor c[v]. By rule (M1), we have A′i = Ai[y 7→ vi][cid 7→ η][nid 7→
hash(t)], where Ai is the variable record in the corresponding closure, vi is the list of arguments in
the invocation requests. By induction, Γ′ ` A1 ≈ζ A2. If the type of any yj satisfies the ζ condition,
then the program counter labels of the corresponding invocation messages also satisfies ζ. Since
P satisfies (RV3), the invocation messages are sent by threads of the same closure reference. By
Γ ;P ` 〈Θ′′1, M′′1, E ′′1 〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ′2, M′2, E ′2〉, those messages are ζ-equivalent, which implies that the
arguments are ζ-equivalent with respect to their types. Therefore, Γ′ ` A′1 ≈ζ A′2.
In addition, we can show Γ ` M1 ≈ζ M2, which means that for any m in dom(Γ), ζ(Γ(m)) implies
M1(m) ≈ζ M2(m). In fact, if Γ(m) = σ@Q, by induction and (ME), we haveM1(m) ≈ M2(m).
If Γ(m) = σ, then it must be the case thatM1[m] = M2[m] orMj [m] = none for some j ∈ {1, 2}.
Otherwise, there exists some thread updatingm before time t such that this thread is completed in one
execution but not in the other. This contradicts (TPE).
Then we can construct a DSR* configuration 〈s, M, ∅, t〉 such that bsci = si and bMci =Mi, and s
and M are well-typed with respect to the following K condition: K(v1@t1, . . . , vn@tn) is true if for
any i, j, ti = tj implies vi ≈ vj . By Lemma 6.5, there exists E′ = 〈s, M, ∅, t〉 7−→∗ 〈s′, M′, Ω′, t′〉
such that bE′ci = E′i and bE′cj  E′j where {i, j} = {1, 2}. Without loss of generality, suppose
bE′c1 = E′1 and bE′c2  E′2. Then there exists a configuration 〈s′′2, M ′′2 , Ω′′2, t′′2〉 such that bM′c2 =
M ′′2 and bΩ′c2 = Ω′′2 and bt′c2 = t′′2 . By Theorem 6.1, M′ and Ω′ are well-typed. Therefore,
Γ ` M ′1 ≈ζ M ′′2 , and Ω′1 ≈ζ Ω′′2 . Moreover, the rest of E′2 modifies the configuration at timestamps
greater than t′1. Thus, Γ ` M ′1 ≈ζ M ′2 and Γ ` Ω′1 ≈ζ Ω′2, which means that the local states of h1
and h2 are still equivalent after this execution step.
• Case (M1). In this case, the goal is to prove t ` Θ′1 ≈ζ Θ′2 where t = min(max(T ′1 , ζ), max(T ′2 , ζ)).
Suppose the newly created thread is θ = 〈s, h, t1, c[v], η〉, and the program counter label of c[v] is pc,
and t′1 = max(T ′′1 , ζ). If ¬ζ(pc, h), then Γ ` 〈Θ′1, M′1, E ′1〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ′2, M′2, E ′2〉 holds immediately by
induction. So we focus on the case that ζ(pc, h) holds.
If t1 < inc(t′1, pc), then we need to prove that θ is not the only thread at time t1. Suppose otherwise.
By t1 < inc(t′1, pc), θ is not invoked by the threads at t′1. Let n be the number of ζ-threads with
timestamps having different global parts in Θ′′1 . Then n − 1 different ζ-threads need to invoke n
different ζ-threads. Therefore, threads at some time td needs to invoke two threads with different
timestamps, which means that different invocation messages satisfying the ζ condition are sent by the
thread replicas at td. That contradicts Γ ;P ` 〈Θ′′1, M′′1, E ′′1 〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ′′1, M′′1, E ′′1 〉. Therefore, θ is not
the only thread at t1, and t ` Θ′1 ≈ζ Θ′2 follows t ` Θ′′1 ≈ζ Θ′2. In addition, θ is ζ-equivalent with
other threads at time t1 because Γ ;P ` 〈Θ′′1, M′′1, E ′′1 〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ′1, M′1, E ′1〉 holds by induction.
If t1 = inc(t′1, pc), by rule (M1), at least one quorum finishes executing the thread at t′1. Suppose
〈Θ′′2, M′′2, E ′′2 〉 7−→ 〈Θ′2, M′2, E ′2〉. Let t′2 = timestamp(Θ′′2, E ′′2 ) and t2 = timestamp(Θ′2, E ′2). If
t2 ≤ t′1, then we have t ` Θ′1 ≈ζ Θ′2 by t ` Θ′′1 ≈ζ Θ′2. Similarly, if t1 ≤ t′2, we have t ` Θ′1 ≈ζ Θ′2
by t ` Θ′1 ≈ζ Θ′′2 . Now consider the case that t′2 < t1 and t′1 < t2. We can prove that t′1 = t′2
and t1 = t2. Suppose t′2 < t′1. By t′1 ` Θ′′1 ≈ζ Θ′2, we have that any invariant thread in Θ′′2 has
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its counterpart in Θ′′1 and has a timestamp less than t′1. But that contradicts t′1 < t2. By the same
argument, we can rule out the case of t′1 < t′2. Therefore, t′1 = t′2, which implies t1 = t2, and it is
clear that t1 ` Θ′1 ≈ζ Θ′2.
• Case (M2). By the same argument as case (M1).
• Case (M3). In this case, some variable in a closure is initialized. So our goal is to prove that
the closure is still equivalent to its counterparts in E2. Suppose E ′1 = E ′′1 [closure(h1, c[v], η) 7→
〈c[v], η, `,A′1[z 7→ v], t′, on〉]. Then we need to show that for any host h2 in loc(c[v]) such that
ζ(c[v], h2), P ` E ′1.closure(h1, c[v], η) ≈ζ E ′2.closure(h2, c[v], η). Let A1 and A2 be the argument
maps in the two closures. Since E ′′1 and E ′2 are equivalent, we only need to prove that ζ(τ) implies
A1(z) ≈ A2(z), where τ is the type of z.
First, we prove that the ζ-messages used to initialize z have the same timestamp. Since P satis-
fies (RV1) and (RV2), the threads that first operate on 〈c[v].z, η〉 correspond to either 〈c′, η′〉, or
〈c1[v1], η1〉 with 〈c[v].z, nid〉 appearing in its code. In either cases, the timestamps of those threads
are equal because 〈Θ′′1, M′′1, E ′′1 〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ′2, M′2, E ′2〉, and the program counter labels of those threads
are ζ-labels. Suppose two setvar messages for z have different timestamps. Then it must be the
case that in the two runs, two reactor instances with the same timestamp send different messages con-
taining 〈c[v].z, η〉. By E ′′1 ≈ζ E ′2, at least one of the reactor instances sends two different messages
containing the remote variable. This contradicts with the fact that P satisfies (RV1). Therefore, the
setvar messages for z have the same timestamp.
If ζ(x) is C(x) ≤ lA, then all the setvar message satisfy the ζ condition, and they are equivalent by
Γ ` 〈Θ′′1, M′′1, E ′′1 〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ′2, M′2, E ′2〉. Thus, the initial values of 〈c[v].z, η〉 are equal in both runs.
Suppose ζ(x) is I(x) 6≤ lA. Consider the message synthesizer pi for z. There are two cases:
– pi is LT[I(`)]. The setvar messages have the form [setvar 〈c[v].z, η〉 :: v, t], and z has type
int`. Since Γ ` 〈Θ′′1, M′′1, E ′′1 〉 ≈ζ 〈Θ′2, M′2, E ′2〉, those high-integrity messages are equiva-
lent. Therefore, the values resulted from synthesizing the setvarmessages are the same in both
runs. Thus, A1(z) ≈ A2(z).
– pi is QR[Q, I]. Suppose the set of high-integrity senders are h1, . . . , hn in E1 and h′1, . . . , h′k
in E2, and the local memory snapshots for these hosts when executing the thread at t are
M1, . . . ,Mn and M ′1, . . . ,M ′k, respectively. Let M incorporate those local memories. By rule
(TPE), we can show that M is well-typed with respect to the followingK constraint:
∀i. vi = v ∨ vi = none
(v1, . . . , vn) ⇓ v
∃vj@tj . vj@tj = v@t ∀i. ti ≤ t
(v1@t1, . . . , vn@tn) ⇓ v
(v1, . . . , vn) ⇓ v (v′1, . . . , v′k) ⇓ v
K(v1, . . . , vn, v′1, . . . , v
′
k)
In addition, we can construct a DSR* statement s such that bsci = si where 1 ≤ i ≤ n + k.
Then we have a well-typed DSR* configuration 〈s, M, ∅, t〉. By Lemma 6.5, 〈s, M, ∅, t〉 7−→∗
〈s′, M′, Ω′, t′〉 and bt′ci ≤ t′i and for some j, bt′cj = t′j . By Theorem 6.1, Ω′ is well-typed,
and the message [setvar 〈c[v].z, η〉 :: v, t] in Ω′ is also well-typed, which means that v =
(v1, . . . , vn, v′1, . . . , v′k) is well-typed. Furthermore, K(v1, . . . , vn, v
′
1, . . . , v
′
k) implies that the
setvar messages produced by QR[Q, I] contain the same initial value v. Therefore, A1(z) =
A2(z).
• Case (A1). For integrity, ζ(m,h) does not hold. Therefore, Γ ` 〈M′1, T ′1 〉 ≈ζ 〈M′2, T ′2 〉 immediately
follows Γ ` 〈M′′1, T ′′1 〉 ≈ζ 〈M′2, T ′2 〉. For confidentiality, we assume attackers would refrain from
changing low-confidentiality data in this case.
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• Case (A2). By the same argument as case (A1).
• Case (A3). In this case, some thread aborts. However, the timestamp of the thread remains unchanged,
and the ζ-equivalence between program states is not affected.
Theorem 6.2 (Integrity Noninterference). Suppose Γ  P , and 〈Θ0, Mi, E0〉 7−→∗ 〈Θ′i, M′i, E ′i〉 for i ∈
{1, 2}. If Γ ;P ` 〈Θ0, M1, E0〉 ≈I 6≤lA 〈Θ0, M2, E0〉, then Γ ;P ` 〈Θ′1, M′1, E ′1〉 ≈I 6≤lA 〈Θ′2, M′2, E ′2〉.
Proof. Let ζ(`) be I(`) 6≤ L and apply Lemma 6.7.
Theorem 6.3 (Confidentiality Noninterference). Suppose Γ  P , and 〈Θ0, Mi, E0〉 7−→∗ 〈Θ′i, M′i, E ′i〉
for i ∈ {1, 2} and Γ ;P ` 〈Θ0, M1, E0〉 ≈C≤lA 〈Θ0, M2, E0〉. Then Γ ;P ` 〈Θ′1, M′1, E ′1〉 ≈C≤lA
〈Θ′2, M′2, E ′2〉.
Proof. Let ζ(`) be C(`) ≤ L and apply Lemma 6.7.
7 Security by construction
This section presents a program transformation that translates an Aimp program into a DSR program to be
executed in a distributed system with untrusted hosts.
7.1 Secure distribution schemes
The Aimp–DSR translator takes as input a distribution scheme D, which specifies where the target code of
source statements is replicated, and where memory references are replicated. To distinguish the same state-
ment appearing in different places of the source, each non-sequence statement S in the source program is
instrumented with a unique name c, and the instrumented statement is written as {c}S. The instrumentation
does not affect the semantics of Aimp. A distribution scheme maps those statement names to host sets.
Formally, a distribution scheme maps statement names to host sets and maps memory references to
quorum systems. If D(m) = Q, then m is replicated on Q in the target program. If D(c) = H , then the
target code of {c}S (not including the target code of the substatements of S) is replicated on H .
In general, many distribution schemes are possible. Because security is the concern here, we do not
give an algorithm for generating distribution schemes, but instead focus on identifying security constraints
sufficient to guarantee that a given distribution scheme is able to enforce the source program’s security
policies.
First, we need to determine the security policies of the source. The security policies of memory refer-
ences are given by the typing assignment Γ of the source program. The security policies of a statement S
are represented by a label derived from the program counter label and the labels of data processed by S. Let
C(S) and I(S) represent the confidentiality and integrity labels of S. Intuitively, C(S) is the join of the
confidentiality labels of inputs of S; I(S) is the join of the integrity labels of outputs of S. Furthermore,
the termination of a while statement depends on the integrity of the statement. Therefore, A(R) ≤ I(S)
needs to hold if S is a while statement with type stmtR. A statement label has two additional confiden-
tiality components: Cend, the confidentiality label of the information that can be inferred by knowing the
termination program point of S, and Cpc, the confidentiality component of the program counter label of S.
The rules for determining the label of a statement are shown in Figure 14. It is safe to assign a stronger
security label to a statement. In practice, assigning a stronger integrity label to a statement makes it easier
to generate control transfer code for that statement because of the extra integrity allows the hosts to perform
more freely. A valid label assignment ∆ satisfies Γ ;Rc ` S′ : `′ and `′ ≤ ∆(c). for any statement {c}S′
appearing in the source program S.
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[L1 ]
Γ ;R ` e : int`′ Γ ;R ` m : int` ref
Γ ;R ; pc ` m := e : {C = C(`′), I = I(`), A = A(R), Cpc = C(pc), Cend = C(pc)}
[L2 ] Γ ;R ; pc ` skip : {C = ⊥, I = ⊥, A = A(R), Cpc = C(pc), Cend = C(pc)}
[L3 ]
Γ ;R ` e : int` Γ ;R ; pc unionsq ` ` Si : `i i ∈ {1, 2}
`′ = {C = C(`), I = I(`1) unionsq I(`2), A = A(R), Cpc = C(pc), Cend = Cpc(`1) unionsq Cpc(`2)}
Γ ;R ; pc ` if e then S1 else S2 : `′
[L4 ]
Γ ;R ; pc ` S1 : `1 Γ ;R ; pc ` S2 : `2
Γ ;R ; pc ` S1;S2 : {C = C(`1) unionsq C(`2), I = I(`1) unionsq I(`2), A = A(R), Cpc = C(pc), Cend = Cpc(`2)}
[L5 ]
Γ ;R ; pc ` e : int` Γ ;R ; pc unionsq ` ` S : `′
Γ ;R ; pc ` while e do S : {C = C(`), I = I(`′) unionsqA(R), A = A(R), Cpc = C(pc), Cend = C(pc)}
[L6 ]
Γ ;R ; pc ` S : ` ` ≤ `′
Γ ;R ; pc ` S : `
Figure 14: Rules for inferring statement labels
We also impose an additional constraint on ∆ to help generate control transfer protocols. Suppose S1
and S2 are two non-sequence statements in the source program S, and S2 is a post dominator of S1 in the
control flow graph of S. Let I1 = I(∆(s1)) and I2 = I(∆(s2)). Moreover, for any post dominator S′
of S1, that S′ dominates S2 implies I1 6≤ I(label(s′)). Then I1 ≤ I2 or I1 ≤ I2 is required. Otherwise,
it is difficult to construct the protocol for transferring control from S1 to S2. Intuitively, because I1 6≤ I2,
the target code of S1 needs to run a chmod statement to notify some following reactor at integrity level I1
to expect invocation requests of integrity level I1 u I2. However, after running the chmod statement, the
integrity level of control flow is lowered to I1 u I2, which makes it difficult to invoke the target code of S2
because I2 6≤ I1 u I2.
A straightforward way to enforce this constraint is to insert a no-op statement S0 = skip between
S1 and S2 and instrument S0 with label {C = C(pc), I = I1 unionsq I2, A = A(label(s2))}, where pc is the
program-counter label of this program point, if I1 and I2 are incomparable.
Let Q  int` ref denote that it is secure to store memory references with type int` ref on Q, and
D ;∆ ;S  {c}S′ denote that it is safe to replicate the target code of {c}S′ on the host setD(c)with respect
to the distribution scheme D, the source program S, and the label assignment ∆. The following rules can
be used to infer these two kinds of judgments:
[DM ]
C(`) ≤ Cu(Q) A(`) ≤ Awrite(Q) uAread,I(`)(Q)
Q  int` ref
[DS ]
{c1}S1; {c}S′ ∈ S ⇒ Cend(∆(c1)) ≤ Cu(H)
∆(c) = ` D(c) = H C(`) ≤ Cu(H)
A(`) ≤ A(H, LT[`]) ∀m ∈ UM (S′). Cpc(`) ≤ Cu(D(m))
D ;∆ ;S  {c}S′
In rule (DM), the first premise C(`) ≤ Cu(Q) guarantees that every host in Q is allowed to read the
value of m. The second premise ensures that the availability of both the read and write operations on Q is
as high as A(`).
In rule (DS), the first premise ensures that H is allowed to know the program counter of the caller of
c. In particular, if S′ follows a conditional statement, H is allowed to know which branch is taken. The
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premise C(`) ≤ Cu(H) says that H is allowed to see the data needed for executing S′. The premise
A(`) ≤ A(H, LT[`]) ensures that H can produce the outputs of S with sufficient integrity and availability.
In addition, a distribution scheme also needs to prevent illegal implicit flows arising from memory read
operations. Let UM (S′) be the set of references accessed by S′. Then for any m in UM (S′), on receiving
a read request for m, hosts in D(m) may be able to infer that control reaches that program point of {c}S′.
Thus, the constraint Cpc(`) ≤ Cu(D(m)) is imposed.
7.2 Remote Memory Accesses
Rule (DS) does not require a statement S to be distributed to the hosts where the references accessed by
S are distributed. Therefore, the target code of S may need to access memory references on remote hosts.
Accordingly, hosts storing a memory reference need to provide reactors to handle remote accesses. Using
DSR, we can implement generic read and write reactors to handle remote memory reads and writes:
read[x :labelx, x1 :labelx, x2 : (intx1@&x2 ref)x1 ,
x3 :reactor{x}x, x4 :intx, x5 : (intx1unionsqx@&x2 var)x]
{ x, #x2, λ(). setvar(x5, !x2); exec(x3, x4, x, #x2, ()) }
write[x :labelx, x1 : (intx@&x1 ref)x, x2 :reactor{x}x,
x3 :intx]
{ x, &x1, λ y :intx. x1 := y; exec(x2, x3, x, &x1, ()) }
To achieve genericity, both read and write reactors carry several reactor parameters. The read reactor
has six parameters: x, the program counter label of this reactor, x2 and x1, the reference to be read and
its label, x3 and x4, specifying the continuation reactor instance 〈x3, x4〉 for returning control to, and x5,
the remote variable to receive the value of reference x2. The read reactor should be invoked on the hosts
holding replicas of reference x1, and the reactor does not update any reference. Thus, #x1 specifies where
this reactor is located. The code of the reactor initializes the remote variable x5 with the value of !x2, and
then invokes 〈x3, x4〉.
The write reactor has four parameters: x, the program counter label of this reactor, x1, the reference to
write to, x2 and x3, specifying the continuation reactor instance 〈x2, x3〉. This reactor has one argument y,
which is the value to be assigned to x1. The code of the reactor is self-explanatory. Since the write reactor
updates x1, it needs to be located on the quorum system &x1.
7.3 Translation rules
The target code P of an Aimp statement S needs to perform the computation of S and invoke the target
code P ′ of the statement following S. On the surface, invoking P ′ means invoking the starting reactor c′
of P ′. However, c′ may not have sufficient integrity to trigger all the computation of P ′. Thus, P may
be responsible for notifying (using chmod messages) the entry reactors of P ′ at different security levels.
An entry reactor c at security level ` is the reactor whose program counter label is ` and there is no other
reactor in P ′ preceding c with a program counter label pc satisfying pc v `. Therefore, the translation
context for S includes Ψ′ = &P ′ = ψ1, . . . , ψn, the list of entries (entry reactors) of P ′, where ψi has the
form 〈ci, wi〉, where wi is a variable whose value is a context identifier with which ci invokes its following
computation. In most cases, wi is cid, and thus ci is used as an abbreviation for 〈ci, cid〉. A well-formed
entry list Ψ′ satisfies the following condition: if label(ψi+1) v label(ψi) holds for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
where label(〈c, w〉) = label(c). In P ′, ψ1 through ψn are to be invoked in order, and for any reactor
c′′ to be invoked between ψi and ψi+1, the constraint label(ψi) v label(c′′) is satisfied so that ψi has
sufficient integrity to handle the invocation of c′′ on its own. Formally, the translation of S is denoted by
[[S]]Ψ′ = 〈P,Ψ〉, where Ψ is the entries of P ∪ P ′.
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[TE1] [[η]]〈c, c′, cu, `,Q〉 = η [TE2] [[m]]〈c, c′, cu, `,Q〉 = m [TE3 ]
Γ(m) = σ
[[!m]]〈c, c′, cu, `,Q〉 =!m
[TE4 ]
Γ(m) = int`1@Qm r = c{`, Q, λ.exec(read[`, `1,m, c′, cid, 〈cu.z, cid〉], nid, `, Q, ())}
[[!m]]〈c, c′, cu, `,Q〉 = 〈{r}, λ(QR[Qm, I(`1)] . z :int`1). z〉
[TE5 ]
[[e1]]〈c, c1, cu, `,Q〉 = 〈P1, λpi1 . z1 :τ1. e′1〉 [[e2]]〈c1, c′, cu, `,Q〉 = 〈P2, λpi2 . z2 :τ2. e′2〉
c1 = (if P2 6= ∅ then new-reactor(P1, c) else c′)
[[e1 + e2]]〈c, c′, cu, `,Q〉 = 〈P1 ∪ P2, λpi1 . z1 :τ1, pi2 . z2 :τ2. e′1 + e′2〉
[TC1 ]
Ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψn} `i = label(ci) i ∈ {1, ..., n} `0 = > `n+1 = ⊥ `j+1 v label(c) v `j
wj+1 = w [[〈c, wi+1〉]]〈`i, ψi+1〉 = 〈si, wi〉 i ∈ {0, . . . , j}
[[〈c, w〉]]Ψ = 〈sj ; . . . ; s0, {〈c, w〉, ψj+1, . . . , ψn}〉
[TC2 ]
∆ ;D ` c :〈`,Q〉 s = (w′ = c′′.z)? setvar(〈c′′.z, nid〉, w) : skip w′′ = (w′ = c′′.z)? w : nid
`′ = label(c) unionsq label(c′) s′ = (` = >)? exec(c′, w′′, `′, Q, ()) : chmod(c′, w′′, `′, Q, `)
[[〈c, w〉]]〈`, 〈c′, w′〉〉 = 〈s; s′, w′′〉
[TS1 ]
∆ ;D ` c :〈`,Q〉 Γ(m) = σ@Qm [[e]]〈c, c1, `,Q〉 = 〈Pe, λpi . z :τ .e′〉 c1 = new-reactor(Pe, c)
r1 = c1{`, Q, pi . z :τ , λ.exec(write[`,m, c2, cid], nid, `, Q, e′)} [[c]]Ψ = 〈s′,Ψ′〉 r2 = c2{`, Q, λ.s′}
[[{c}m := e]]Ψ = 〈Pe ∪ {r1, r2},Ψ′〉
[TS2 ]
∆ ;D ` c :〈`,Q〉 Γ(m) = σ [[e]]〈c, c1, `,Q〉 = 〈Pe, λpi . z :τ . e′〉 c1 = new-reactor(Pe, c)
[[c]]Ψ = 〈s′,Ψ′〉 r1 = c1{`, Q, pi . z :τ , λ. m := e′; s′}
[[{c}m := e]]Ψ = 〈Pe ∪ {r1},Ψ′〉
[TS3 ]
∆ ;D ` c :〈`,Q〉 [[c]]Ψ = 〈s,Ψ′〉 r = c{`, Q, λ.s}
[[{c} skip]]Ψ = 〈{r},Ψ′〉 [TS4 ]
[[S2]]Ψ = 〈P2,Ψ2〉 [[S1]]Ψ2 = 〈P1,Ψ1〉
[[S1;S2]]Ψ = 〈P1 ∪ P2,Ψ1〉
[TS5 ]
∆ ;D ` c :〈`,Q〉 [[e]]〈c, c1, `,Q〉 = 〈Pe, λpi . z :τ . e′〉 c1 = new-reactor(Pe, c)
[[Si]]Ψ = 〈Pi,Ψi〉 [[c]]Ψi = 〈s′i,Ψ′〉 i ∈ {1, 2} r1 = c1{`, Q, pi . z :τ , λ. if e′ then s′1 else s′2}
[[{c} if e then S1 else S2]]Ψ = 〈Pe ∪ P1 ∪ P2 ∪ {r1},Ψ′〉
[TS6 ]
∆ ;D ` c :〈`,Q〉 [[e]]〈c, c1, `,Q〉 = 〈Pe, λpi . z :τ .e′〉 [[S]]c = 〈P,Ψ1〉
c1 = new-reactor(Pe, c) [[〈c1, nid〉]]Ψ1 = 〈s1, 〈c1, nid〉〉 [[〈c, c1.z′〉]]Ψ = 〈s2,Ψ′〉
r1 = c1{`, Q, pi . z :τ , LT[`] . z′ :int`, λ. if e′ then setvar(〈c1.z′, nid〉, z′); s1 else s2}
[[{c} while e do S]]Ψ = 〈Pe ∪ P ∪ {r1},Ψ′〉
Figure 15: Aimp–DSR Translation rules
The translation of a source expression e generates a DSR expression e′ that results in the same value as
e does in the source program. In addition, the memory accesses in e might require invoking read reactors
on remote hosts. Therefore, the translation result of e is composed of two parts: P , a distributed program
that fetches the values of replicated memory references, and λpi . z :τ .e′, where e′ computes the final value
of e, and z are free variables of e′, initialized by messages going through pi. The translation context of e is
a five-element tuple 〈c, c′, cu, `,Q〉, where c is the starting reactor of P , c′ is the continuation reactor of P ,
cu is the reactor that computes e′, ` is the program counter label for e, andQ is the quorum system where P
is replicated.
The syntax-directed translation rules are shown in Figure 15. Rules (TE1)–(TE5) are used to translate
expressions; rules (TS1)–(TS6) are used to translate statements; rules (TC1) and (TC2) are used to generate
control transfer code. All these translation rules are with respect to a translation environment 〈Γ,∆, D〉,
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where Γ is the typing assignment for the target program,∆ is the label assignment, andD is the distribution
scheme. The typing assignment Γ = [[Γ′]]D is derived from the typing assignment Γ′ of the source program.
For any m in dom(Γ′), suppose D(m) = Qm. Then Γ(m) is Γ′(m) if Qm contains only one host, and
Γ′(m)@Qm otherwise. Notation ∆ ;D ` c : 〈`,Q〉 means that ` and Q are the program counter label and
the location of reactor c. Formally, D(c) = Q, and ` = {C = Cpc(`′), I = I(`′), A = A(`′)}, where
`′ = ∆(c). The rules use a function new-reactor(P, c), which is a fresh reactor name unless P is empty, in
which case it is c.
Rules (TE1)–(TE3) translate constants and dereferences of non-replicated references, which remain the
same after translation. Rule (TE4) is used to translate !m when m is replicated on multiple hosts. The
target code invokes read[`, `1,m, c′, cid, 〈cu.z, cid〉], which initializes 〈cu.z, cid〉 with the value of m
and invokes 〈c′, cid〉. Note that the read reactor is invoked with nid so that read requests issued by
different reactors are distinguishable.
Rule (TE5) translates the addition expression e1 + e2. It combines the translations of e1 and e2 in a
natural way. Suppose ei is translated into 〈Pi, λpii . zi :τi.e′i〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then e1 + e2 is translated
into 〈P1 ∪ P2, λpi1 . z1 :τ1, pi2 . z2 :τ2. e′1 + e′2〉. The tricky part is to figure out the translation contexts
of e1 and e2. Expression e1 is computed first, so P1 is executed before P2. Therefore, c is the entry of
P1, c′ is the successor of P2, and both the entry of P2 and the successor of P1 are some reactor c1. In
general, c1 is a fresh reactor name. However, there are two exceptions. First, P2 is empty. Second, P2
is not empty, but P1 is empty. In the first exception, c′ is the successor of P1, and thus c1 = c′. In the
second exception, c is the entry of P2, and c1 = c. Putting it all together, c1 is computed by the formula
(if P2 6= ∅ then new-reactor(P1, c) else c′).
Rules (TC1) and (TC2) generate the code for c to invoke Ψ with the context identifier w. It can be
viewed as translating 〈c, w〉 in the context Ψ. The translation result is a tuple 〈s,Ψ′〉 where s is the control
transfer code, andΨ′ is the entries of the computation starting with c. In practice, c can also invoke a reactor
c′ that has the same security level as c, and let c′ run s to invoke Ψ.
Suppose Ψ = ψ1, . . . , ψn, and `i = label(ψi) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, `0 = >, and `n+1 = ⊥. If `j+1 v
label(c) v `j , then c is able to invoke ψ1, . . . , ψj , andΨ′ is {〈c, w〉, ψj+1, . . . , ψn}. Now the only remaining
task is to generate the code for invoking ψj , . . . , ψ1 in order.
Let [[〈c, wi+1〉]]〈`i, ψi+1〉 = 〈si, wi〉 denote that s is the code to invoke ψi+1 with w to the label `i, and
w′′ is the context identifier to be used after executing si. Therefore, the code to invoke Ψ is sj ; . . . ; s0.
Rule (TC2) is used to compute [[〈c, w〉]]〈`, 〈c′, w′〉〉. The translation depends on whether w′ is some
remote variable c′′.z and whether ` is >. If w′ = c′′.z, then the translation includes a setvar statement to
initialize 〈c′′.z, nid〉 with w so that c′′ can invoke the following computation with the context identifier w.
Moreover, after executing the setvar statement, c needs to invoke the remaining entries with nid, and w′′
is set to nid. If ` is >, it means that 〈c′, w′〉 is to be invoked directly, and thus the translation includes an
exec statement to invoke c′. Otherwise, the translation uses a chmod statement to invoke c′ to label `.
Rule (TS1) is used to translate {c}m := e when Γ(m) = σ@Qm. Since m is replicated on Q, the
assignment is done by invoking the write reactors on Q. The reactor write[`,m, c2, cid] updates m and
then invokes 〈c2, cid〉. The reactor c2 contains the code to invoke Ψ with cid. The value of e is computed
by Pe and λpi . z :τ .e′. Reactor c is the entry of Pe. Reactor c1 computes e′ and issues the write requests.
Thus, c1 contains pi . z :τ as its variables. Therefore, the translation context of e is 〈c, c1, `,H〉, which is an
abbreviation for 〈c, c1, c1, `,H〉. Note that if Pe is empty, then c1 is the entry of the translation, and c1 = c.
Rule (TS2) translates {c}m := e when Γ(m) = σ. Expression e is translated in the same way as in
rule (TS1). Since m is not replicated, m := e is simply translated into m := e′, followed by the code for
invoking Ψ.
Rule (TS3) translates the skip statement. Since skip does nothing, the translation only needs to generate
code to invoke Ψ.
Rule (TS4) translates the sequential statement S1;S2. First, S2 is translated into 〈P2,Ψ2〉 with respect
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to Ψ. Then, S1 is translated in the context Ψ2. The target code of S1;S2 is the union of the target code of
S1 and S2.
Rule (TS5) is used to translate conditional statements. Expression e is translated in the same way as in
rule (TS1). Reactor c1 computes e′ and executes the conditional statement to determine which branch to
take and invoke the target code of that branch. The two branches S1 and S2 have the same continuation.
Therefore, S1 and S2 are translated in the same context Ψ, and the translation results are 〈P1,Ψ1〉 and
〈P2,Ψ2〉. Then reactor c1 needs to invoke Ψ1 if e′ is evaluated to a positive value, and Ψ2 if otherwise. The
control transfer code is generated by [[c]]Ψi. Note that label(c) is a lower bound to the security label of any
reactor in P1 and P2 because it affects whether these reactors are invoked. As a result, [[c]]Ψ1 and [[c]]Ψ2
generate the same initial entries Ψ′.
Rule (TS6) translates while statements. Expression e is translated in the same way as in rule (TS1). Im-
plementing a loop, the target code of a while statement may be invoked multiple times, and each invocation
needs to have a different context identifier so that it would not be confused with other invocations. When
the loop terminates, Ψ needs to be invoked with the same context identifier w regardless of the number of
iterations. Thus, w cannot be cid or nid, which changes in each iteration. Therefore, the context identifier
used to invokeΨ is the variable z′ of reactor c1, which computes e′ and determines whether to enter the loop
body or to invoke Ψ with z′. The code for entering the loop body starts with setvar(〈c1.z′, nid〉, z′) so
that z′ is initialized with the same value in every iteration. The loop body S is translated with respect to c,
because control is returned to c after the loop body terminates. The premise [[S]]c = 〈P,Ψ1〉 says that the
entries of the target code of S is Ψ1. Therefore, c1 needs to invoke Ψ1 with nid if the value of e′ is positive.
And the control transfer code is generated by [[〈c1, nid〉]]Ψ1.
7.4 Typing preservation
The DSR language relies on static typing to enforce security. Therefore, the Aimp–DSR translation needs to
produce well-typed target programs. This is guaranteed by the typing preservation theorem (Theorem 7.1),
which roughly says that the target code of a well-typed source program is a well-typed program in DSR.
Definition 7.1 (Well-formed entry list). An entry list Ψ is well-formed with respect to P , written P  Ψ,
if the following two conditions hold. First, for any entry 〈c, w〉 in Ψ, P (c) = c[x :σ]{pc, Q, pi . z :τ , λ.s},
and if w = c′.z, then P ` 〈c′.z, cid〉 : (int` var)`′ . Second, if Ψ = 〈c1, w1〉, . . . , 〈cn, wn〉, then
label(ψi+1) v label(ψi) holds for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where label(〈ci, wi〉) = label(ci).
Lemma 7.1 (Control transfer typing soundness). Suppose P is the target code of an Aimp program under
the translation environment 〈Γ,∆, D〉, and ∆ ;D ` c : 〈pc,Q〉, and P  Ψ, and [[〈c, w〉]]Ψ = 〈s,Ψ′〉. Then
Γ, w :intpc, nid :intpc ;P ;Q ; pc ` s : τ , and P  Ψ′.
Proof. By inspecting the translation rules (TC1) and (TC2).
Lemma 7.2 (Typing preservation). Suppose [[Γ]]D = Γ′, and P ′ is the target code of an Aimp program S′.
If e is an expression in S′, and Γ ;R ; pc ` e : τ , and [[e]]〈c, c′, cu, `,H〉 = 〈P, λpi . z :τ .e′〉, and P ′  c, c′,
then Γ′ ;P ′ ` P and Γ′, z : τ ` e′ : τ . If S is a statement in S′, and Γ ;R ; pc ` S : τ , and [[S]]Ψ = 〈P,Ψ′〉
and P ′  Ψ′, then Γ′ ;P ′ ` P .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ;R ; pc ` e : τ or Γ ;R ; pc ` s : τ .
• Cases (INT) and (REF). Obvious.
• Case (DEREF). If Γ′(m) = σ, then e′ is !m, and P is ∅ by rule (TE3). We have Γ′ `!m : τ , since
τ = σ. If Γ′(m) = int`1@Qm, by rule (TE4), P = {r} where
r = c{`, Q, λ.exec(read[`, `1,m, c′, cid, 〈cu.z, cid〉], nid, `, Q, ())}.
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By rules (EXEC) and (RD), we have:
Γ′ ` read[`, `1,m, c′, cid, 〈cu.z, cid〉] : reactor{`, Qm} ` v `
Γ′ ;P ′ ;Q ; ` ` exec(read[`, `1,m, c′, cid, 〈cu.z, cid〉], nid, `, Q, ()) : stmt`
Γ′ ;P ′ ` r
• Case (ADD). By induction, Γ′ ;P ′ ` P1 and Γ′ ;P ′ ` P2. Thus, Γ′ ;P ′ ` P1 ∪ P2. By induction,
Γ′, zi :τi ` e′i : τ for i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, Γ′, z1 :τ1, z2 :τ2 ` e′1 + e′2 : τ .
• Case (SKIP). By Lemma 7.1.
• Case (SEQ). S is S1;S2, and we have Γ ;R ; pc ` S1 : stmtR1 and Γ ;R1 ; pc ` S2 : τ . By rule
(TS4), [[S2]]Ψ = 〈P2,Ψ1〉 and [[S1]]Ψ1 = 〈P1,Ψ′〉. By induction, Γ′ ;P ′ ` P2 and Γ′ ;P ′ ` P1.
Therefore Γ′ ;P ′ ` P1 ∪ P2.
• Case (ASSIGN). S is m := e, and Γ ;R ` e : int`′ . By rules (TS1) and (TS2), [[e]]〈c, c1, `,Q〉 =
〈Pe, λpi . z :τ .e′〉. By induction, Γ′ ;P ′ ` Pe and Γ′, z :τ ` e′ : int`′ .
If Γ(m) = σ@Qm, then (TS1) is used. By Lemma 7.1, Γ′ ;P ′ ` r2. Let Γ′′ = Γ′, z :τ , cid :
int`, nid :int`. Then the following derivation shows that r1 is also well-typed:
Γ′ ;P ′ ` write[`,m, c2, cid] : reactor{`, Qm, int`}
Γ′′ ` nid : int` Γ′′ ` ` : label⊥ ` v ` Γ, z :τ ` e′ : int`
Γ′′ ;P ′ ;Q ; ` ` exec(write[`,m, c2, cid], nid, `, Qm, e′) : stmt`
Γ′ ;P ′ ` r1
If Γ(m) = σ, then (TS2) is used. By Lemma 7.1, Γ′′ ;P ′ ;Q ; ` ` s′ : τ . Therefore, we have the
following derivation:
Γ′ ` m : (int` ref)` Γ′, z :τ ` e′ : int` ` v int`
Γ′, z :τ ;P ′ ;Q ; ` ` m := e′ : stmt` Γ′′ ;P ′ ; ` ` s : τ
Γ′ ;P ′ ` r1
• Case (IF). S is if e then S1 else S2. By induction, Pe, P1 and P2 are well-typed, and e′ is well-
typed with respect to Γ′, z :τ . By Lemma 7.1, s′1 and s′2 are well-typed. Therefore, the statement
if e′ then s′1 else s′2 is well-typed, and so is r1.
• Case (WHILE). S is whileedoS′. By induction, Pe and P are well-typed. The following derivation
proves that r1 is well-typed:
Γ′, z :τ , z′ :int` ` z′ : int` ` 〈c1.z′, nid〉 : (int` var)`
Γ′, z :τ , z′ :int` ; ` ` setvar(〈c1.z′, nid〉, z′) : stmt`,{〈c1.z′, nid〉} Γ′, z :τ , z′ :int` ; ` ` s′1 : τ
Γ′, z :τ , z′ :int` ;P ′ ;Q ; ` ` setvar(〈c1.z′, nid〉, z′); s′1 : τ
Γ′, z :τ , z′ :int` ; ` ` e′ : int`′
Γ′, z :τ , z′ :int` ; ` ` setvar(〈c1.z′, nid〉, z′); s′1 : τ Γ′, z :τ , z′ :int` ; ` ` s′2 : τ
Γ′, z :τ , z′ :int` ;P ′ ;Q ; ` ` if e′ then setvar(〈c1.z′, nid〉, z′); s′1 else s′2 : τ
Γ′ ;P ′ ` r1
• Case (SUB). Obvious by induction.
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Theorem 7.1 (Typing preservation). Suppose Γ ;R ; pc ` S : τ , and [[S]]∅ = 〈P, c〉 with respect to a
distribution scheme D, and S = {c}S1;S2. Then Γ′  P , where Γ′ = [[Γ]]D.
Proof. By Lemma 7.2, Γ′ ` P . By examining the translation rules, P satisfies (RV1)–(RV3).
7.5 Semantics preservation
In general, an adequate translation needs to preserve semantics of the source program. In a distributed
setting, attackers may launch active attacks from bad hosts, making the low-integrity part of the target
execution deviate from the source execution. However, the trustworthiness of the target code does not
depend on the low-integrity program state. Therefore, we consider a translation adequate if it preserves
high-integrity semantics.
This notion of semantics preservation is formalized as two theorems. First, the translation soundness
theorem says that there exists a benchmark execution of the target program generating the same outputs as
the source program execution. Based on Theorem 6.2, any execution of the target program would result in
equivalent high-integrity outputs as the benchmark execution and the source program. Therefore, we only
need another theorem stating that any target execution achieves the same availability as the source.
To prove the translation soundness theorem, we construct an equivalence relation between an Aimp con-
figuration and a DSR configuration, and show that there exists a DSR evaluation to preserve the equivalence
relation. Informally, a target configuration 〈Θ, M, E〉 and a source configuration 〈S, M〉 are equivalent, if
M and M are equivalent, and Θ and E indicate that the code to be executed by 〈Θ, M, E〉 is exactly the
target code of S. SupposeD is the distribution scheme used in the translation. The equivalence betweenM
andM is defined as follows:
Definition 7.2 (Γ ;D ` M ≈ M). For any m in dom(Γ), then M(m) = M(h,m) for any h ∈ D(m),
whereM(m,h) = v if v@t is the most recent version ofm on host h.
The configuration 〈Θ, M, E〉 must be able to execute the target code of S. As a result, the entries of
the target code of S must be activated in 〈Θ, M, E〉 with respect to the current context identifier, as defined
below:
Definition 7.3 (E ; η  Ψ). That Ψ is activated with context identifier η in the environment E , written
E ; η  Ψ, if it can be inferred using the following rules, where E(w, η) returns η if w is cid, and the value
of 〈c.z, η〉 in E if w is c.z.
E ; η  〈c, w〉 E ; E(w, η) ; label(c)  Ψ
E ; η  〈c, w〉,Ψ
E ; η ; `  〈c, w〉 E ; E(w, η) ; label(c)  Ψ
E ; η ; `  〈c, w〉,Ψ
∀h ∈ hosts(c). 〈c, η, `,A, t, off〉 ∈ E(h)
E ; η  〈c, w〉
∀h ∈ hosts(c). 〈c, η, `′,A, t, ∗〉 ∈ E(h) ` v `′
E ; η ; `  〈c, w〉
To track the activated entries during program execution, we introduce the notation P ; Ψ ` S : Ψ′, which
intuitively means that executing the target code of S with the list of activated entries Ψ would result in the
list of activated entries Ψ′. Formally, it is defined using the following inference rules:
[EL1 ] P ; Ψ ` skip : Ψ [EL2 ] [[S]]Ψ
′ = 〈P ′,Ψ〉 P ′ ⊆ P
P ; Ψ ` S : Ψ′
[EL3 ]
P ; Ψ ` S : Ψ′ Ψ1 = 〈c, c1.z〉,Ψ2
P ; Ψ,Ψ1 ` S : Ψ′ ⊗Ψ1 [EL4 ]
P ; Ψ ` S1 : Ψ1 P ; Ψ1 ` S2 : Ψ2
P ; Ψ ` S1;S2 : Ψ2
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The unnamed statement skip has no effects or target code. Thus, rule (EL1) says that executing the target
code of skip does not activate any new entry. Rule (EL2) is straightforward based on the meaning of
[[S]]Ψ′ = 〈P ′,Ψ〉. Rule (EL3) is applied to the case that S belongs to the body of a while statement, andΨ1
is the entry list for the computation following S. Based on the translation rule (TS6), Ψ1 = 〈c, c1.z〉,Ψ2,
where 〈c, c1.z〉 is the entry for the next iteration of the while statement. Suppose P ; Ψ ` S : Ψ′. IfΨ′ = c,
then after S terminates, the next iteration of the loop would start, and the activated entry list would be 〈,1〉.
Otherwise, the entry list at the point that S terminates is Ψ′,Ψ1. Suppose Ψ1 = 〈c, c1.z〉,Ψ2. Then the
notation Ψ′ ⊗ Ψ1 denotes Ψ1 if Ψ′ = c, and Ψ′,Ψ1 if otherwise. Rule (EL4) is standard for composing
P ; Ψ ` S2 : Ψ1 and P ; Ψ1 ` S2 : Ψ2, as the termination point of S1 is the starting point of S2.
To construct the benchmark execution, it is convenient to assume that all the reactor replicas are running
synchronously, and to formalize the program point that a target configuration corresponds to. A program
point is represented by 〈s; Ψ;Π〉, where s is the code of the current running threads,Ψ is the entry list for the
program P following the current thread, andΠ is a set of communication ports used by P . A communication
port is either a reactor name c or a remote variable name c.z. Intuitively, at the program point represented
by 〈s; Ψ;Π〉, the entry list Ψ are activated, and there are no messages for the communication ports in Π yet.
Formally, we have the following definition:
Definition 7.4 (Θ ; E ; η  〈s; Ψ; Π〉). A configuration 〈Θ, M, E〉 corresponds to the program point 〈s; Ψ; Π〉
with respect to the context identifier η, written Θ ; E ; η  〈s; Ψ; Π〉, if the following conditions hold with
Ψ = c ; Ψ′. First, any unfinished thread in Θ has the form 〈s, t, h, c, η〉, and the timestamp of any thread in
Θ is less than or equal to t. Second, E ; η  Ψ. Third, for any pi in Π, if pi = c′ and c′ 6= c, then E contains
no exec messages for 〈pi, η〉; if pi = c.z does not appear in Ψ, then E contains no setvar messages for
〈pi, η〉. If s is the code of c, then 〈Ψ;Π〉 is an abbreviation of 〈s; Ψ; Π〉.
Now we define the DSR-Aimp configuration equivalence and prove the translation soundness theorem
after proving two lemmas.
Definition 7.5 (DSR-Aimp configuration equivalence). A DSR configuration 〈Θ, M, E〉 and an Aimp con-
figuration 〈S, M〉 are equivalent with respect to Γ, P , η and Ψ′, written as Γ ;P ; η ` 〈Θ, M, E〉 ≈
〈S, M, Ψ′〉, if the following conditions hold. First, P ; Ψ ` S : Ψ′. Second, Θ ; E ; η  〈Ψ; ΠS〉, where ΠS
are the set of communication ports of the target code of S. Third, Γ `M ≈M.
Lemma 7.3 (Expression translation soundness). Suppose [[e]]〈c, c′, cu, `,H〉 = 〈P, λpi . τ z.e′〉, and 〈e, M〉 ⇓
v, and Γ `M ≈M, and Θ ; E ; η  〈c,Ψ; ΠP ∪ {c′, cu.z} ∪Π〉. Then there exists a run 〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→∗
〈Θ′, M, E ′〉 such that Θ′ ; E ′ ; η  〈c′,Ψ; Π〉, and 〈e′[A], M[h, t]〉 ⇓ v, where A is the variable record in
the closure 〈cu, η〉 on host h.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e.
• e is n. Trivial.
• e is !m and Γ(m) = σ. Then P is empty, and e′ is !m. Since Γ ` M ≈ M, we have that
〈!m, M(h, t)〉 ⇓M(m).
• e is !m and Γ(m) = int`1@Q. By (TE4), P is {r}, and
r = c{`, Q′, λ.exec(read[`, `1,m, c′, cid, 〈cu.z, cid〉], nid, `, Q′, ()).
Then by running the exec statement, we have 〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→∗ 〈Θ1, M, E1〉, and
Θ1 ; E1 ; η′  〈s′; read[`, `1,m, c′, cid, 〈cu.z, cid〉],Ψ; {c′, cu.z} ∪Π〉,
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where s′ is setvar(〈cu.z, η〉, !m); exec(c′, η, `, , ()). In other words, the execution reaches the
point that all the replicas of the read reactor are invoked with the newly-created context identifier
η′. Further, by executing s′ on all the hosts of m and processing all the messages sent by s′, the
execution produces 〈Θ1, M, E1〉 7−→∗ 〈Θ′, M, E ′〉 such that Θ′ ; E ′ ; η  〈c′; Ψ; Π〉. By Γ ` M ≈
M, the synthesizer QR[Q, I] associated with cu.z receives the setvar messages containing the same
versioned value v@t′ where v = M(m). Therefore, z is mapped to v in the closure 〈cu, η〉 by the
evaluation rule (M3). Thus, 〈z[A], M(h, t)〉 ⇓ v.
For simplicity, we write such an execution run in the form of the following table, where each line
denotes that the execution produces a system configuration (the first column), which corresponds to a
program point (the second column) and satisfies certain constraints (the third column), based on some
reasoning (the fourth column).
〈Θ, M, E〉
7−→∗ 〈Θ1, M, E1〉 〈s′; Ψ′; {c′, cu.z} ∪Π〉
7−→∗ 〈Θ′, M, E ′〉 〈c′,Ψ; Π〉 〈z[A], M(h, t)〉 ⇓M(m) By Γ `M ≈M
• e is e1+e2. By (TE5), we have [[e1]]〈c, c1, cu, `,Q〉 = 〈P1, λpi1 . τ1 z1. e′1〉 and [[e2]]〈c1, c′, cu, `,Q〉 =
〈P2, λpi2 . τ2 z2. e′2〉. Then we have the following execution:
〈Θ, M, E〉
7−→∗ 〈Θ1, M, E1〉 〈c1,Ψ; ΠP2 ∪ {c′, cu.z2} ∪Π〉 〈e′1[A], M(h, t)〉 ⇓ v1 By induction
7−→∗ 〈Θ′, M, E ′〉 〈c′,Ψ; Π〉 〈e′2[A], M(h, t)〉 ⇓ v2 By induction
Therefore, 〈e′1 + e′2[A], M(h, t)〉 ⇓ v, where v = v1 + v2 and A is the variable record of the closure
〈cu, η〉 on h.
Lemma 7.4 (Control transfer soundness). Suppose [[〈c, w〉]]Ψ′ = 〈s,Ψ〉, andΨ = 〈c, w〉,Ψ′′, andΘ ; E ; η 
〈s; c1,Ψ′′; Π〉. Then 〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→∗ 〈Θ′, M, E ′〉 such that Θ′ ; E ′ ; η′  〈Ψ′; Π〉, where η′ = E(w, η).
Proof. By inspecting translation rules (TC1) and (TC2).
Theorem 7.2 (Translation soundness). Suppose Γ ;R ; pc ` S : τ , and 〈S, M〉 7−→ 〈S′, M ′〉, and
Γ ;P ; η ` 〈Θ, M, E〉 ≈ 〈S, M, Ψ′〉. Then there exists a run E = 〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such
that Γ ;P ; η′ ` 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 ≈ 〈S′, M ′, Ψ′〉. In addition, for any message µ sent in E, the port of µ is
either in Ψ or in ΠS .
Proof. By induction on the evaluation step 〈S, M〉 7−→ 〈S′, M ′〉. Because Γ ;P ; η ` 〈Θ, M, E〉 ≈
〈S, M, Ψ′〉, we have P ; Ψ ` S : Ψ′, and Θ ; E ; η  〈Ψ; ΠS〉, and Γ ` M ≈M .
• Case (S1). In this case, S is {c}m := e, andM ′ =M [m 7→ v], and 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v. SupposeΨ = c,Ψ1.
Then we have
〈Θ, M, E〉
7−→∗ 〈Θ1, M, E1〉 〈c1,Ψ1; ΠS −ΠPe〉 〈e′[A], M(h, t)〉 ⇓ v By Lemma 7.3
If Γ(m) = σ@Q, then rule (TS1) is used, and the code of c1 is exec(write[`,m, c2, cid], nid, `, , e′).
Thus, we have
〈Θ1, M, E1〉
7−→∗ 〈Θ2, M, E2〉 〈m := v; exec(c2, η, `, &m, ()); write[`,m, c2, η],Ψ1; {c2}〉
7−→∗ 〈Θ3, M′, E3〉 〈c2,Ψ1; ∅〉 M′ =M[m 7→ v]
7−→∗ 〈Θ4, M′, E4〉 〈Ψ′; ∅〉 Ψ′ ` skip : Ψ′ By Lemma 7.4
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If Γ(m) = σ, the rule (TS2) is used, and the code of c1 is m := e′; s′, where s′ comes from [[c]]Ψ′ =
〈s′,Ψ〉. Thus, we have
〈Θ1, M, E1〉
7−→∗ 〈Θ2, M′, E2〉 〈s′; c1,Ψ1; ∅〉 M′(h,m) = v
7−→∗ 〈Θ3, M′, E3〉 〈Ψ′; ∅〉 By Lemma 7.4
• Case (S2). S is S1;S2, and P ; Ψ ` S1;S2 : Ψ′, which implies that P ; Ψ ` S1 : Ψ1 and P ; Ψ1 `
S2 : Ψ′. By induction, there exists a run E = 〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that Γ ;P ; η `
〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 ≈ 〈S′1, M ′, Ψ1〉. Therefore, Θ′ ; E ′ ; η  〈Ψ′1; ΠS′1〉, and for any pi that receives a
message in E, if pi 6∈ ΠS1 , then pi ∈ Ψ′1. Thus, we have Θ′ ; E ′ ; η  〈Ψ′1; ΠS′1;S2〉. In addition, Ψ′1 `
S′1 : Ψ1 holds. So P ; Ψ′1 ` S′1;S2 : Ψ′. Thus, we have Γ ;P ; η〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 ≈ 〈S′1;S2, M ′, Ψ′〉.
• Case (S3). S is {c} skip;S′. By Ψ ` {c} skip;S′ : Ψ′, we have Ψ ` {c} skip : Ψ′1 and Ψ′1 ` S′ :
Ψ′. Then we have
〈Θ, M, E〉 〈c,Ψ1; ΠS〉
7−→∗ 〈Θ′, M, E ′〉 〈Ψ′1; ΠS′〉 By rule (TS3) and Lemma 7.4
• Case (S4). SinceP ; Ψ ` S : Ψ′, we have that [[S]]Ψ′1 = 〈P ′,Ψ1〉, andΨ = Ψ1,Ψ2 andΨ′ = Ψ′1⊗Ψ2.
By rule (TS5), Ψ1 = c,Ψ′′. Then we have
〈Θ, M, E〉
7−→∗ 〈Θ1, M, E1〉 〈c1,Ψ′′; ΠS〉 〈e′[Ac1,η], M(h, t)〉 ⇓ n By Lemma 7.3
7−→∗ 〈Θ2, M, E2〉 〈s1; c1,Ψ′′; ΠS1〉 By (S5)
7−→∗ 〈Θ3, M, E3〉 〈Ψ′′1; ΠS1〉 Ψ′′1 ` S1 : Ψ′1 By Lemma 7.4
Also the above run is limited to the code of S and does not affect Ψ2. Therefore, Θ3 ; E3 ; η 
〈Ψ′′1,Ψ2; ΠS1〉, and P ; Ψ′′1,Ψ2 ` S1 : Ψ′. Thus, 〈Θ3, M, E3〉 ≈ 〈S1, M, Ψ′1〉.
• Case (S5). By the same argument as in case (S4).
• Case (S6). S is while e do S1, and S′ is S1; while e do S1, and 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n (n > 0). Then we have:
〈Θ, M, E〉
7−→∗ 〈Θ1, M, E1〉 〈c1,Ψ′′; ΠS〉 〈e′[Ac1,η], M〉 ⇓ n By Lemma 7.3
7−→∗ 〈Θ2, M, E2〉 〈setvar(〈c1.z′, nid〉, z′); s1; c1,Ψ′′; ΠS〉 By (S5)
7−→∗ 〈Θ3, M, E3〉 〈s1; c1; ΠS1〉 E3 ;AΘ3(nid) ; `c  〈c, c1.z′〉,Ψ′′
7−→∗ 〈Θ′, M, E ′〉 〈Ψ1; ΠS1〉 AΘ′(cid) = AΘ3(nid) By Lemma 7.4
Therefore, 〈Θ′, E ′〉 ≈ 〈Ψ1, 〈c, c1.z′〉,Ψ′′; ΠS1;S〉. In addition, Ψ1, 〈c, c1.z′〉,Ψ′′ ` S1;S : Ψ′. Thus,
we have 〈Θ′, M, E ′〉 ≈ 〈S1; while e do S1, M, Ψ′〉.
• Case (S7). S is while e do S1, and 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n, and n ≤ 0. Then we have:
〈Θ, M, E〉
7−→∗ 〈Θ1, M, E1〉 〈c1,Ψ′′; ΠS〉 c1 ` 〈e′, M〉 ⇓ n By Lemma 7.3
7−→∗ 〈Θ2, M, E2〉 〈s2; c1,Ψ′′; ∅〉
7−→∗ 〈Θ3, M, E3〉 〈Ψ′′; ∅〉 E3 ; nid ; `c  〈c, c1, w〉,Ψ′′ By Lemma 7.4
46
Now we show that a target program achieves the same availability as the source program. First, we
formally define the notion that a target memoryM has the same availability as a source memoryM:
Definition 7.6 (Γ ` M ≈A6≤lA M ). For anym such that A(Γ(m)) 6≤ lA, ifM(m) 6= none, then for any h
in Qm, A(h) 6≤ lA impliesM(h,m) 6= none.
Again, we prove the availability preservation result by induction. First, we prove two lemmas about
the availability of expression target code and control transfer code. The availability results need to be
applicable to all executions. Thus, we use “〈Θ, M, E〉 ;∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that a condition holds” to
mean that for any run 〈Θ, M, E〉 7−→∗ 〈Θ1, M1, E1〉, there exists 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 satisfying the condition
and 〈Θ1, M1, E1〉 7−→∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉. Let E  〈c.z, η〉 denote that the value of 〈c.z, η〉 is already set in
E . More concretely, For any host h of c, the variable record of the closure 〈c, η〉 on host h maps z to a value
that is not none. In addition, let E  〈c, η〉 denote that the closure 〈c, η〉 has been invoked on all the hosts
of c in E . Then the expression availability lemma is formalized as follows:
Lemma 7.5 (Expression availability). Suppose Γ ;R ; pc ` e : int`, and 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n, and A(R) 6≤ lA,
and [[e]]〈c, c′, cu, `,Q〉 = 〈Pe, λpi . τ z. e′〉, and there exists 〈Θ, M, E〉 such that E  〈c, η〉, and Γ `
M ≈A6≤lA M . Then 〈Θ, M, E〉;∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that E ′  〈c′, η〉 and E ′  〈cu.z, η〉.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e.
• e is n, m, or !m with Γ(m) = σ. In this case, [[e]]〈c, c′, cu, `,H〉 = e and c = c′. Thus, E  〈c′, η〉
and E ′  〈cu.z, η〉 immediately hold.
• e is !m, with Γ(m) = σ@Q. By rule (TE3), Pe = {r} and
r = c{`, Q, λ.exec(read[`, `1,m, c′, cid〈cu.z, cid〉], nid, `, , ())}.
Since E  〈c, η〉, 〈Θ, M, E〉 ;∗ 〈Θ1, M1, E1〉 such that E1  〈read[`, `1,m, c, η, 〈cu.z, η〉], η′〉
where η′ = E(c.nid, η). Since A(R) 6≤ lA, by rule (DM), A(Q) 6≤ lA, which means that at least a
QR[Q, I(`)]-qualified set of hosts in Q are available to finish executing the read reactor. Therefore,
〈Θ1, M1, E1〉;∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that E ′  〈c, η〉 and E ′  〈cu.z, η〉.
• e is e1+ e2. By induction, 〈Θ, M, E〉;∗ 〈Θ1, M1, E1〉 such that E1  〈c1, η〉 and E1  〈cu.z1, η〉.
Again, by induction, 〈Θ1, M1, E1〉;∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that E ′  〈c′, η〉 and E ′  〈cu.z2, η〉.
Lemma 7.6 (Control transfer availability). Suppose [[〈c, w〉]]Ψ′ = 〈s,Ψ〉, and 〈Θ0, M0, E0〉 7−→∗ 〈Θ, M, E〉
such that E ; η  Ψ, and E  〈c1, η〉, and the body of c1 ends with s, and A(c1) 6≤ lA. Then 〈Θ, M, E〉;∗
〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that E ′ ; η′  Ψ′.
Proof. By inspecting rules (TC1) and (TC2).
Lemma 7.7 (Availability preservation I). Suppose Γ ;R ; pc ` S : stmtR′ , and I(pc) ≤ lA andA(R) 6≤ lA,
and P ; Ψ ` S : Ψ′, and 〈Θ, M, E〉 satisfies E ; η  Ψ and available (M, R, lA), which means that for
any m in dom(Γ), A(Γ(m)) 6≤ lA and m 6∈ R imply that m is available in M. Then 〈Θ, M, E〉 ;∗
〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that E ′ ; η  Ψ′, and available (M′, R′, lA).
Proof. By induction on the structure of S.
• S is skip. Since Ψ′ = Ψ, 〈E , M, Θ〉 already satisfies the conditions.
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• S is {c} skip. By Lemma 7.6.
• S is {c}m := e. Then we have [[S]]Ψ′ = 〈P1,Ψ1〉, and P1 ⊆ P . First, suppose Γ(m) = σ. By (TS2),
[[e]]〈c1, c′1, `,H〉 = 〈Pe, λpi . τ z.e′〉. Since A(R) 6≤ lA, we have 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n. By Lemma 7.5 and
E ; η  Ψ1, we have 〈Θ, M, E〉 ;∗ 〈Θ1, M1, E1〉 such that E1  〈c′1, η〉. Suppose h′ is the host
where c′1 resides. By rule (DS), A(m) ≤ A(h′). If A(R) 6≤ lA, then A(m) 6≤ lA and A(h′) 6≤ lA,
which means that h′ is available. SinceR′ isR−{m}, we haveR′ ` M′ ≈A6≤lA M ′. By rule (TS2)
and Lemma 7.6, 〈Θ1, M1, E1〉;∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that E ′ ; η  Ψ′.
• S is S1;S2. By induction.
• S is {c} if e then S1 else S2. Since A(R) 6≤ lA, 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n. Suppose Γ ;R ` S : `, and
Qc = 〈H, ∅〉. Then A(R) ≤ A(H, LT[`]). Since A(R) 6≤ lA, there exists a LT[`]-qualified subset
H ′ of H such that Au(H ′) 6≤ lA. Therefore, there exists a subset H ′′ of H ′ such that I(`) ≤ I(H ′′)
and all the hosts of H ′′ takes the same branch. Without loss of generality, suppose the first branch
is taken. Then by (TS5) and Lemma 7.6, 〈Θ, M, E〉 ;∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that E ′ ; η  Ψ′′ and
Ψ′′ ` S1 : Ψ′. Then the induction hypothesis is applicable.
• S is while e doS′. By the typing rule (WHILE) of Aimp, I(pc) ≤ lA implies A(R) ≤ lA. Thus, this
case cannot occur.
According to the translation soundness theorem, for a run of the source program 〈S, M〉 7−→∗ 〈S′, M ′〉,
there is a benchmark run of the target program that behaves similar to the source run. Therefore, we can
associate each evaluation step of the source program with the context identifier of the corresponding eval-
uation step in the benchmark target execution, and use the notation 〈S1, M1〉η1 7−→ 〈S2, M2〉η2 to denote
that η1 and η2 are the corresponding context identifier of configurations 〈S1, M1〉 and 〈S2, M2〉.
Lemma 7.8 (Availability preservation II). Suppose Γ ;R ; pc ` S : stmtR′ and I(pc) 6≤ lA andA(R) 6≤ lA
and 〈S, M〉η 7−→ 〈S1, M1〉η′ , and P ; Ψ ` S : Ψ′, and 〈Θ, M, E〉 satisfies E ; η  Ψ and Γ ` M ≈A6≤lA
M . Then 〈Θ, M, E〉;∗ 〈Θ2, M2, E2〉 such that E2 ; η′  Ψ2, andΨ2 ` S2 : Ψ′, and Γ ` M2 ≈A6≤lA M1,
and S1 ≈ S2, which means either S1 = S2 or for i ∈ {1, 2}, Si = S′i;S′′ such that Γ ;R ; pc ` S′i : stmt′R
and I(pc) ≤ L.
Proof. By induction on 〈S, M〉 7−→ 〈S′, M ′〉. Without loss of generality, suppose [[S]]Ψ′ = 〈P,Ψ〉. In
general, [[S]]Ψ′′ = 〈P,Ψ1〉 and Ψ = Ψ1,Ψ3 and Ψ′ = Ψ′′⊗Ψ3. If the theorem holds for Ψ1 ` S : Ψ′′, then
we have Ψ2 ` S2 : Ψ′′. Therefore, Ψ2,Ψ3 ` S2 : Ψ′′ ⊗Ψ3, that is, Ψ′2 ` S2 : Ψ′.
• Case (S1). S is m := e, and M1 = M [m 7→ v] where 〈e, M〉 ⇓ v. There are two cases. First,
Γ(m) = σ. By (TS2), [[e]]〈c, c1, `,H〉 = 〈Pe, λpi . τ z.e′〉, and the first element of Ψ is c. By
Lemma 7.5 and E ; η  Ψ, we have 〈Θ, M, E〉 ;∗ 〈Θ1, M1, E1〉 such that E1 ; η  c1. By (TS2),
the code of c1 ism := e′; s′ where [[c]]Ψ = 〈s′,Ψ′〉. Suppose h1 is the host where c1 resides. By rule
(DM), A(m) ≤ A(h1). Since A(R) 6≤ lA, we have A(h1) 6≤ lA, which means that h1 is available
to finish executing the thread of 〈c1, η〉. Since m is the only location updated in this evaluation step,
and m is also updated during executing the target program, we have Γ′ ` M2 ≈A6≤lA M1. By rule
(TS2), [[c]]Ψ′ = 〈s′,Ψ〉. By Lemma 7.6, 〈Θ1, M1, E1〉 ;∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 in finite steps such that
E ′ ; η′  Ψ′. In addition, S2 is skip, and Ψ′ ` skip : Ψ′.
Second, Γ(m) = σ@Qm. By rule (DS), A(R) ≤ A(H, LT[I(m)]). As a result, at least a LT[I(m)]-
qualified subset H ′ of H are available to invoke write[`,m, c2, η]. Since A(`) 6≤ lA, at least a
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quorum of Qm is available. The available quorum is able to finish executing the write reactor and
invoke c2 on Q. By rule (TS1), the code of c2 is s′. Due to A(`) 6≤ lA, the available hosts in Q
have sufficient integrity so that the remote requests sent by s′ would be accepted. By Lemma 7.6,
〈Θ1, M1, E1〉;∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that E ′ ; η′  Ψ′.
• Case (S2). S is S1;S2, and 〈S1, M〉 7−→ 〈S′′1 , M ′〉. By Ψ ` S : Ψ′, we have Ψ ` S1 : Ψ1, and
Ψ1 ` S2 : Ψ′. By induction, 〈Θ, M, E〉;∗ 〈Θ2, M2, E2〉 such that E2 ; η  Ψ2, and Ψ2 ` S′1 : Ψ1
and S1 ≈ S′1. Therefore, S1;S2 ≈ S′1;S2, and Ψ2 ` S′1;S2 : Ψ′.
• Case (S3). If S is {c} skip;S2, the conclusions immediately hold by Lemma 7.6. Otherwise, S is
skip;S2. Thus, S1 = S2, and P ; Ψ ` S2 : Ψ′ since P ; Ψ ` skip : Ψ.
• Case (S4). S is if e then S1 else S2, and 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n and n > 0. By Lemma 7.5, 〈Θ, M, E〉 ;∗
〈Θ1, M, E1〉 such that E1 ; η  c1. By Theorem 7.2, there exists a benchmark execution 〈Θ0, M0, E0〉 7−→∗
〈Θ2, M2, E2〉 such that 〈e′[Ac1,η], M2〉 ⇓ n. If I(e) 6≤ L, then by Theorem 6.2, for any h in Qc1 ,
〈e′[Ac1,η], M(h, t)〉 ⇓ n, and the execution takes the branch s′1. By Lemma 7.6, 〈Θ1, M, E1〉 ;∗
〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that E ′ ; η ` Ψ2 where [[S1]]Ψ′ = 〈P1,Ψ2〉.
If I(e) ≤ L, attackers may be able to compromise the integrity of e and make the execution to take
the second branch. In that case, we have 〈Θ1, M, E1〉 ;∗ 〈Θ′, M, E ′〉 such that E ′ ; η  Ψ2 and
P ; Ψ2 ` S2 : Ψ′. Furthermore, S1 ≈ S2 since I(e) ≤ L.
• Case (S5). By the same argument as case (S4).
• Case (S6). S is while e do S1, 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n, n > 0, and S′ is S1; while e do S1. By Lemma 7.5,
〈Θ, M, E〉 ;∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that E ′ ; η  c1. Moreover, A(R) 6≤ lA implies I(e) 6≤ lA. By
Theorem 7.2, for any h in Q(c1) such that I(h) 6≤ lA, 〈e′[Ac1,η], M′(h, t)〉 ⇓ n. Since n > 0,
“setvar(〈c1.z′, nid〉, z′); s1” is executed on host h. By executing setvar(〈c1.z′, nid〉, z′) and
processing the messages the statement, 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 ;∗ 〈Θ1, M1, E1〉 such that E1 ; η′  Ψ2. By
executing s1 and processing the messages sent by s1, 〈Θ1, M1, E1〉 ;∗ 〈Θ2, M2, E2〉 such that
E2 ; η′  Ψ′.
• Case (S7). S is while e do S1, 〈e, M〉 ⇓ n, n ≤ 0, and S′ is skip. By Lemma 7.5, 〈Θ, M, E〉 ;∗
〈Θ1, M, E1〉 such that E ′′ ; η  c1. Since I(e) 6≤ lA, for any h in Qc1 such that I(h) 6≤ lA,
〈e′[Ac1,η], M(h, t)〉 ⇓ n, and s2 is executed on h. Therefore, by Lemma 7.6, 〈Θ1, M, E1〉 ;∗
〈Θ′, M, E ′〉 such that E ′ ; η′  Ψ′.
Theorem 7.3 (Availability preservation). Suppose Γ ;R ; pc ` S : τ , and 〈S, M〉 7−→∗ 〈S′, M ′〉, and
[[S]]∅ = 〈P, c〉, andM ≈M. Then 〈Θ0, M, E0〉;∗ 〈Θ′, M′, E ′〉 such that Γ ` M′ ≈A6≤lA M ′
Proof. By induction on the number of steps of 〈S, M〉 7−→∗ 〈S′, M ′〉, and Lemmas 7.7 and 7.8.
8 Related Work
The most closely related work is the Jif/split system [27, 28] that introduced secure program partitioning
and automatic replication of code and data. However, Jif/split cannot specify or enforce availability, and
there is no correctness proof for the replication mechanisms in Jif/split.
Language-based information flow control techniques [5, 23, 10, 17, 18, 3, 20] can enforce noninterfer-
ence, including in concurrent and distributed systems [21, 19, 26]. But this work does not address availability
and assumes a trusted computing platform.
49
In previous work [29], we extend the DLM to specify availability policies and present a type-based
approach for enforcing availability policies in a sequential program. This paper examines the distributed
setting to permit formal analysis of the availability guarantees of various replication schemes.
Walker et al. [24] designed λzap, a lambda calculus that exhibits intermittent data faults, and use it
to formalize the idea of achieving fault tolerance through replication and majority voting. However, λzap
describes a single machine with at most one integrity fault.
Quorum systems [11, 14] are a well studied technique for improving fault tolerance in distributed sys-
tems. Quorum systems achieve high data availability by providing multiple quorums capable of carrying
out read and write operations. If some hosts in one quorum fail to respond, another quorum may still be
available.
The Replica Management System (RMS) [12] computes a placement and replication level for an object
based on programmer-specified availability and performance parameters. RMS does not consider Byzantine
failures or other security properties.
Program slicing techniques [25, 22] provide information about the data dependencies in a piece of soft-
ware. Although the use of backward slices to investigate integrity and related security properties has been
proposed [6, 13], the focus of work on program slicing has been debugging and understanding existing
software.
The design of DSR was inspired by concurrent process calculi such as the join calculus [7] and the actor
model [2].
9 Conclusions
This paper presents a framework for running a security-typed sequential program and enforcing its availabil-
ity, integrity and confidentiality policies in a realistic distributed platform that contains mutually distrusted
hosts. To achieve a strong availability guarantee along with strong integrity and confidentiality guarantees,
this paper has solved several technical challenges. More complicated replication schemes such as quorum
systems have been used to enforce both integrity and availability and guarantee replica consistency. Multi-
level timestamps are used to achieve synchronization while preserving confidentiality of control flow.
This paper also presents a security-typed distributed intermediate language DSR, and a formal transla-
tion from a sequential source program to a target distributed program in DSR. The noninterference results
of DSR and the adequacy of the translation together provably guarantee that the target code of a well-typed
source program enforces the security policies of the source.
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